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Last Term:
Charles Thomas DICKERSON
V.
UNITED STATES
No. 99-5525
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 26, 2000
COURT UPHOLDS MIRANDA WARNINGS
Justices Reaffim Suspects'Rights in 7-2 Decision
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, June 27,2000
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
refused yesterday to overrule its famous
Miranda decision, put that ruling on a firm
constitutional footing and ordered police across
the nation to continue warning suspects about
their rights.
The 7-2 decision - probably the most
important criminal law ruling in decades - was
written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, a
longtime critic of the 1966 decision.
Clearing up doubts about the status of
Miranda warnings that have been raised over
the past quarter-century by the court, at
Rehnquist's urging, the new decision declares
that "Miranda is constitutionally based."
That means it is still binding on state and
local police and federal agents when they want
to question a person in custody. As a result,
officers who fail to give the warnings run the
risk of having any confession a suspect gives
barred as evidence of guilt.
"Miranda," Rehnquist wrote, "has become
embedded in routine police practice to the
point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture."
Under the decision, police must advise
suspects they are holding of their rights to
remain silent, to have a lawyer and to have a
court-appointed lawyer if they cannot afford
one.
Besides declining to disturb the ruling in
Miranda vs. Arizona by its action, the court also
ruled that Congress does not have the power to
undermine that decision.
The court thus struck down a seldom-
applied 1968 law adopted two years after
Miranda but never tested before the Supreme
Court until now. That law was enacted by a
Congress with a majority that had been angered
by criminal-law rulings that favored suspects'
rights.
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In that law, Congress sought to overrule
the 1966 decision by replacing Miranda
warnings with a requirement that any
confession that was clearly voluntary could be
used as evidence even if no warnings had been
given. In Miranda, the court had ruled that any
confession given without warnings could never
be considered voluntary.
The new decision came in the case of a
Maryland man, Charles Thomas Dickerson of
Suitland. He confessed to having played a role
in a bank robbery in Alexandria, Va., but he did
so apparently without having been given the
Miranda warnings.
A federal judge barred that confession
from his case. The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on the 1968 law, allowed the
confession to serve as evidence against
Dickerson. It said the confession had been
voluntary, even if given without the Miranda
warnings.
Federal prosecutors remain free to put
Dickerson on trial, using evidence other than
the confession, including cash found in his
home. They may also ask the appeals court to
reconsider its ruling that Dickerson was not
given the Miranda warnings so that they could
use the confession.
The Supreme Court's decision to give new
constitutional vitality to the Miranda decision
was denounced yesterday by the National
Association of Police Organizations. Its
executive director, Robert T. Scully, said his
group was " very disappointed."
"Under Miranda, voluntary, reliable
confessions are excluded from evidence for
'technical' violations, even when there is no
suggestion of police wrongdoing, but instead
inadvertence or confusion," he said.
The American Civil Liberties Union
praised the ruling for "forcefully" preserving
Miranda rights.
Stephen R. Shapiro, the ACLU's legal
director, said his group "has always believed,
and the court agreed, that effective law
enforcement does not and should not depend
on keeping people ignorant of their rights."
When Rehnquist, near the close of a public
session yesterday, announced that the court had
decided the Miranda case and that he had
written the decision, a gasp was heard in the
courtroom, as if this persistent critic of Miranda
had persuaded the court to scuttle or weaken
the warnings.
The chief justice began by reciting the
familiar warnings. He said those words "have
echoed through police stations and across TV
screens."
Then, hushing the audience, Rehnquist
said, "Miranda is a constitutional decision and
may not be overruled by Congress."
In decision after decision since Miranda
was decided, the court had declared that it was
not a constitutional ruling.
The Miranda decision, the court had said in
a phrase first used by Rehnquist, was a
"prophylactic" ruling only - that is, one
intended to assure that suspects were not
forced into giving confessions, but not one
commanded by the Constitution.
In those decisions, the court had allowed
some confessions to be used in criminal trials
even when the warnings had not been given,
though not as direct proof of guilt.
Yesterday, Rehnquist said none of those
rulings was being abandoned. But he went on
to describe them as refinements of Miranda's
core ruling requiring warnings.
" The sort of modifications represented by
these cases are as much a normal part of
constitutional law as the original decision," he
wrote.
Those rulings, the chief justice said, do not
say "that Miranda is not a constitutional rule."
It is, he stressed. The language in those
opinions suggesting that Miranda was not
constitutionally based, he said, was not decisive.
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A key to the court's decision was its Copyright C) 2000 The Baltimore Sun
apparent desire to continue requiring Miranda Company
warnings in cases involving state and local
police. If the court had ruled that Miranda
warnings were not a constitutional rule, the
warnings would no longer be binding on state
and local officers, because the court has power
over their actions only when they violate the
Constitution.
- The Justice Department had made it clear
that federal agents would continue to give the
warnings even if the Supreme Court found
them no longer required constitutionally. But
the department had taken the position that
Miranda was constitutionally required and that
it should continue to be binding.
Rehnquist's opinion was supported by
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M.
Kennedy, David H. Souter and John Paul
Stevens.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a stinging
dissent, accusing the majority of "judicial
arrogance" for assuming the authority to
establish specific controls on state and local
officers and to override Congress' judgment.
Scalia said that over the years, a clear
majority of the court - including some justices
who voted in the majority yesterday - had
sharply criticized the Miranda decision and
treated it as if it was not compelled by the
Constitution.
In decisions since Miranda, Scalia wrote,
"the court has squarely concluded that it is
possible - indeed, not uncommon - for the
police to violate Miranda without also violating
the Constitution." He said that by reassuming
the power to enforce Miranda warnings in the
face of Congress' opposing view, the court had
employed "an immense and frightening anti-
democratic power."
Scalia's dissent was supported by Justice
Clarence Thomas.
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A TURF BATTLE'S UNLIKELY VICTIM
The New York Times
Wednesday, June 28, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
Timing, in constitutional law no less than in
life or love, can mean everything, and when it
came to timing, the opponents of the Miranda
decision who finally managed to push the
Supreme Court into revisiting the case after 34
years turned out to have been spectacularly
unlucky.
There might well have been a period,
sometime in the last three decades, when the
court would have overturned Miranda, a bitterly
fought 5-to-4 decision that had appeared ever
since to have an ever more fragile hold on the
court's loyalties.
But it was the bad fortune of opponents
finally to get the justices' attention at the very
moment when the court's interest in protecting
its constitutional turf against Congressional
incursions was at a peak unmatched in recent
years.
At issue in the case decided on Monday was
a 1968 law by which Congress sought to
overturn Miranda by replacing the familiar
warnings with the case-by-case test of a
confession's "voluntariness" that the Miranda
decision found constitutionally inadequate.
The notion that Congress would tell the
court what the Constitution does or does not
mean undoubtedly would have offended the
court when the law was passed. By this year,
when the court got its first chance to rule on
the law, the idea was anathema, and a much
more conservative group of justices than the
members of the Warren Court who had
struggled over the confession issue 34 years ago
struck down the law and reaffirmed Miranda by
a 7-to-2 vote.
In a real sense, the surprisingly lopsided
decision this week said more about the court
itself than about Miranda or about defendants'
rights in general.
"It's power, pure power," said Leon
Friedman, a constitutional law professor at
Hofstra Law School. "The court is telling
Congress: 'You can't overturn our good
decisions, and you can't overturn our bad
decisions. You can't overturn our decisions --
period.' "
One precedent Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist cited in his opinion was telling: City
of Boerne v. Flores, the 1997 decision that
overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. Congress had passed that law in 1993 to
give more official protection to religious
practice than the court had said, in a decision
three years earlier, the First Amendment's free
exercise clause provided for. "The power to
interpret the Constitution in a case or
controversy remains in the judiciary," Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the court in the
Boerne case.
In that instance, Congress was being more
protective of individual rights than the court,
while in the anti-Miranda statute, known as
Section 3501, it was less protective. The
outcome was the same. "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution," Chief Justice
Rehnquist said on Monday in the Miranda case,
United States v. Dickerson.
Barely a month earlier, in his opinion for
the court striking down the civil damages
provision of the Violence Against Women Act
on the ground that Congress had exceeded its
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constitutional authority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reached back to Chief Justice John Marshall's
declaration in Marbury v. Madison in 1803 for
the ultimate statement of judicial supremacy: "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."
Even in the context of the other recent
cases, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the court on Monday was notable
because it placed him so strikingly against type.
He joined the court six years after Miranda was
decided and even as a very junior associate
justice quickly became one of the decision's
most outspoken critics.
He has never been known for changing his
mind, and there is no reason to think that he
has changed his basic view of the decision.
What quite clearly gave him pause was not
some newfound affection for Miranda, but the
possible consequences to the court of
overturning it at this point, after dozens of
decisions had applied Miranda to state-court
convictions and to state prisoners' federal
petitions for habeas corpus.
As the chief justice noted in his opinion,
the only possible source of the court's authority
to apply Miranda came from the decision's
status as a direct interpretation of the
Constitution. To decide now that Congress had
legislatively overruled Miranda 32 years ago -- a
colossal "never mind" -- would have made the
court look ineffectual if not fatuous. A close
student of the court's history, on which he has
published three well-received books, Chief
Justice Rehnquist may well have been dismayed
by the prospect that a decision to overturn
Miranda might go down in the public mind as
the main legacy of his tenure as chief justice.
The 75-year-old chief justice may not be as
preoccupied with his legacy as President
Clinton is with his; unlike the president, the
chief justice faces no timetable for leaving
office and, for all anyone knows, may have no
retirement plans. Still, having served on the
court since the age of 47, for the last 14 years as
chief justice, it would hardly be surprising if he
had another, more affirmative sort of legacy in
mind.
And in fact, his mark on the court is
substantial. He is the prime mover behind the
federalism revolution, the court's dramatically
revived interest in policing the exercise of
Congressional power as well as the boundary
between state and federal authority.
Since 1995, when the court ruled in United
States v. Lopez, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, that Congress had exceeded its
authority in making it a federal crime to carry a
gun near a school, the court has invalidated all
or part of 25 federal laws, many on federalism
or separation of powers grounds. When
Miranda's opponents set Section 3501 years ago
on its circuitous journey to the court, they
should have expected heavy waters but can be
excused for not having anticipated the shoals
on which the statute foundered and ultimately
sank.
Copyright C) 2000 The New York Times
Company
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Last Tenn:
Charles C. APPRENDI, Jr.
V.
NEW JERSEY
No. 99-478
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 26, 2000
N.J. LAW ON HATE CRIMES SQUASHED; JURIES, NOT JUDGES, SHOULD HAVE
POWER
The Record (Bergen County, N.J.)
Tuesday, June 27,2000
Christopher Mumma
New Jersey's hate-crime law was struck
down Monday by the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
move viewed as an effort by the justices to
reverse a continuing trend of taking power out
of the hands of juries.
The 5-4 ruling by a sharply divided
Supreme Court called the law an "unacceptable
departure from the jury tradition" for giving a
judge sole discretion in deciding whether a hate
crime has been committed and what the penalty
ought to be.
The decision was met with little apparent
concern by Governor Whitman, who said that
the prosecution of hate crimes in New Jersey
will continue once the state's Ethnic
Intimidation Act is rewritten.
"They didn't say you can't have hate-crime
legislation," Whitman said Monday. "What
they've struck down was the fact that the power
resided with the judge."
The ruling, though, could have a wide
impact on a number of cases involving so-
called "penalty 1 enhancements," which
sometimes give judges wide latitude for
increasing criminal sentences if certain
conditions are met.
"I think this will have tremendous impact,"
said Richard Singer, a criminal law professor at
Rutgers University who helped draft the brief in
the Supreme Court case. "It's really nice to see
the court come out and stick up for the jury. I
believe very, very deeply in the jury system."
The justices reached their decision in
response to an appeal by Vineland pharmacist
Charles Apprendi Jr., who pleaded guilty to
shooting at the house of a black family living in
a white neighborhood in Vineland on Dec. 22,
1994.
Apprendi was arrested 20 minutes after the
shooting and allegedly told police that he was
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"just giving them a message that they were in
his neighborhood."
Later, Apprendi recanted that statement
and said he only shot at the home because he
did not like the purple front door.
At his sentencing, a Superior Court judge
ruled that Apprendi's actions had been the
product of racial bias. The judge granted the
prosecution's request for an extended term,
which raised Apprendi's maximum sentence
from 10 to 20 years. He was given a 12-year
sentence.
Apprendi's lawyer, Joseph O'Neill of
Vineland, appealed the sentence to the state
Supreme Court but lost.
Then he took his case to the federal jurists.
"I just thought that they were wrong,"
O'Neill said. "I figured let's take a shot at it."
In its decision Monday, the U.S. Supreme
Court said Apprendi should be resentenced.
Apprendi has served 5 1/2 years so far and is in
a halfway house, O'Neill said.
"I think they should let him go right away,"
the attorney said.
More than 40 states have hate-crime
legislation. Most have chosen to create new
crimes consisting solely of bias-motivated
violence. Other states added bias as an element
to already-existing crimes.
New Jersey is one of few states that permit
a judge to increase a prison term if a person
commits a crime "with a purpose to intimidate
an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity."
It is also one of the few to give judges a
lower standard for finding that a hate crime has
been committed. New Jersey judges only have
to find that there is a "preponderance of
evidence," rather than the usual standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Around the country, judges grant extended
terms for a variety of different crimes.
In New Jersey, for instance, the Graves
Act is frequently used. In a Graves Act case, a
defendant convicted of an offense such as
robbery, assault, and burglary faces enhanced
penalties if the crime involves a firearm.
Because of the wider application,
proponents of hate-crime legislation said
Monday they were not disheartened by the
ruling.
"Even though we lost, it is not a blow to
hate-crime laws," said Brian Levin, of the
California-based Center for Hate and
Extremism, which filed its own brief in the case
before the Supreme Court. "It's
really a blow to the penalty enhancements. It's
going to be really interesting with regard to all
of the ways we enhance punishment."
Some penalty enhancements, such as the
widely appropriated "three-strikes-and-you're-
in" prison policy, also appear safe, court
observers said. The justices specifically
excluded one routine method of increasing
penalties: a prior criminal conviction.
Although the justices directed a number of
questions about the death penalty to O'Neill
during oral arguments in May, they did not
address it in their ruling.
"That's the ultimate enhancer," Levin said.
"But they seemed to indicate that it was a
separate issue."
Copyright ( 2000 Bergen Record Corp.
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THE SUPREME COURT: TRIAL BY JURY
New Jersey Hate Crime Law Struck Down
The New York Times
Tuesday, June 27, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court declared New Jersey's
hate crime law unconstitutional today on the
twin grounds that it improperly permitted the
judge, rather than the jury, to make the crucial
finding that the crime was motivated by bias
and that it did not require proof of that finding
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The 5-to-4 decision will have only a modest
impact in the area of hate crime legislation
because most states already require a jury to
make the finding of motive under the
reasonable doubt standard.
But the decision opens the door to
challenges to sentencing procedures in many
other contexts, including federal drug sentences
and even the structure of the federal sentencing
guidelines themselves, in which the jury
determines guilt and the judge makes many
essentially factual determinations that lead to
the final sentence.
As the dissenters warned today, and the
justices in the majority did not dispute, the
decision could cause widespread ferment in
criminal sentencing. The four dissenters said
the decision marked "a watershed change in
constitutional law."
With five separate opinions totalling 106
pages, the decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey,
No. 99-478, was one of the most closely fought
and in some respects surprising of the term.
The case cut across the court's usual ideological
lines. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the
majority opinion, which was joined by Justices
Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence
Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justices
Scalia and Thomas also filed concurring
opinions.
The dissenters were Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer, who each
wrote dissenting opinions, along with Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Anthony M.
Kennedy.
The court had been pointing in this
direction in recent decisions, but the majority
opinion put the holding starkly and
unequivocally: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
The New Jersey hate crime law is similar to
a law in North Carolina, but differs from those
of other states that make the finding of a biased
motive an element of the offense that the
prosecution has to charge in the indictment and
prove to the jury like any other element of the
crime.
The hate crime bill the New York
Legislature passed this month follows this latter
model, as does the federal bill that cleared the
Senate last week.
The New Jersey law was challenged by a
Vineland man, Charles C. Apprendi Jr., who
had pleaded guilty in 1995 to firing several
bullets into a neighboring black family's home.
The maximum sentence for the firearms
offense was 10 years.
Under the hate crime law, the prosecutor
asked the trial judge to find that the crime had
been motivated by racial bias. At a hearing, Mr.
Apprendi, who is white, disputed the charge,
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but the judge found against him and sentenced
him to 12 years. The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the law in a decision last year.
The Supreme Court sent the case back to
the New Jersey state court to reconsider the
sentence.
Writing for the majority today, Justice
Stevens said that "at stake in this case are
constitutional protections of surpassing
importance," the right to due process of law
and the guarantee of a trial by jury.
He said that it was one thing for a judge to
exercise discretion within the statutory range
for the offense as set by the legislature. But he
said the court could not accept "the novelty of
a legislative scheme that removes the jury from
the determination of a fact that, if found,
exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty
exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the
jury verdict alone."
Responding to the decision, Gov. Christine
Todd Whitman said, "What we need to do is
amend the law and put that power back in the
jury."
While the majority opinion suggested that
the constitutional problems could be avoided as
long as any judicially imposed sentencing
factors kept the final sentence within the
statutory range for the offense, the dissenters
expressed considerable doubt that the decision
could logically be confined within those
boundaries.
Justice O'Connor said that if the decision
meant, as it appeared to, "that a defendant is
entitled to have a jury decide, by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, every fact relevant to the
determination of sentence under a determinate-
sentencing scheme," then the ruling "will have
the effect of invalidating significant sentencing
reform accomplished at the federal and state
levels over the past three decades."
Further, she said, the decision "threatens to
unleash a flood of petitions by convicted
defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences
in whole or in part." Justice O'Connor said the
majority's failure "to clarify the precise contours
of the constitutional principle underlying its
decision" left federal and state judges "in a state
of limbo."
The court will almost immediately have a
chance to indicate whether it wants to let this
debate simmer in the lower courts, or assign
itself the task of clarifying the full import of
today's ruling. The justices have been keeping
several cases involving the sentencing
guidelines and, particularly, federal narcotics
sentencing, on their docket while awaiting a
decision in this case.
The drug cases would appear to be
particularly vulnerable to the majority analysis
today because the jury in such cases typically
finds guilt while the sentencing judge makes
many crucial determinations about the type and
quantity of the drugs, the harm caused by the
offense and the characteristics of the offender.
Copyright D 2000 The New York Times
Company
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The People of the State of ILLINOIS v. Charles McARTHUR
Why can Inot get back into my trailer, officer?
David P. Primack'
Can police officers prevent someone from entering their own home while the officers procure a
search warrant if the officers suspect the home contains illegal drugs? The Supreme Court will have to
unravel this question as well as its confusing holding in Segura v. United States (1984) to figure out
whether Charles McArthur's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police prevented his
return to his trailer without first arresting him or having obtained a warrant to search his home.
In April of 1997, Tera McArthur elicited the protection of the local police when she decided to
remove her belongings from the trailer of her husband Charles. After moving out, Tera told the police
officers that Charles was hiding marijuana underneath his couch. When questioned by the police about
Tera's accusation, Charles denied that he had any marijuana and refused to allow the officers to search
the trailer. At this point, the officers decided to obtain a search warrant. Ironically, given the marital
relations evidenced here, it was Officer Love who remained with Charles and prevented him from
entering his trailer unsupervised for fear that he might destroy the evidence. For the approximately two
hours that it took the police to return with a search warrant, Charles McArthur was not allowed into his
trailer and at no time was he arrested, placed in handcuffs, or told that he was free to leave. The police
eventually found the drugs and placed him under arrest.
At issue in this case is whether Charles' Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the
police officers refused to allow him back into his home even though they had no search warrant and
had not placed him under arrest. The trial court found that the police officers' actions violated Charles'
constitutional rights. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court's decision, and the
Supreme Court of Illinois denied the State's petition to appeal.
In the Appellate Court decision, Judge Robert Cook analyzed the somewhat cryptic Supreme
Court decision in Segura to show that in this case, unlike Segura. there was an unreasonable search and
seizure. The State of Illinois argued that McArthur should be governed by Segura where the police kept
officers inside an apartment for 19 hours until a search warrant was obtained and used the evidence in
the apartment to prosecute these offenders. The State argued that the Supreme Court held in Part IV
of the decision in Segura that "securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the
destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable
seizure of either the dwelling or its contents."
The Appellate court disagreed with this interpretation of Segura. Judge Cook noted that only
two justices signed on to Part IV of the Segura decision and that therefore it was not binding precedent
on lower courts. According to Judge Cook, the Court never expressed an opinion on whether the
police may legitimately limit the freedom of access to an impounded dwelling. Instead, the Supreme
Court appeared to limit its holding to the specific facts of the case and determined that here the police's
actions were not unreasonable.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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It is clear that legal scholars and laypeople alike will be following McArthur closely. The former
will hope that the Supreme Court clarifies Segura and the latter will find out if police can detain one's
home and person waiting for a warrant. With some of the courts split on this issue, the Supreme
Court's decision will be an important one.
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99-1132 Illinois v. McArthur
Ruling below (Ill. App. Ct., 304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 238 Ill. Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d 93):
Police officers violated Fourth Amendment when they removed resident from home regarding which
they had probable cause for search, secured home for approximately two hours while awaiting search
warrant, and prevented resident from re-entering unless accompanied by officer to prevent removal or
destruction of evidence; evidence obtained pursuant to warrant must be suppressed.
Question presented: Is it constitutionally reasonable for police officers to secure residence from
outside, and prohibit occupant's entry into that residence for short time while they obtain search
warrant based on probable cause, in light of this court's suggestion in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796 (1984), that such conduct is reasonable under Fourth Amendment and findings of other courts that
similar behavior is consistent with Fourth Amendment and Segura?
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The people of the STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Charles McARTHUR, Defendant-Appellee.
Appellate Court of Illinois
Fourth District
Decided May 7, 1999
COOK, Judge.
In May 1997, defendant Charles McArthur
was charged by information with two counts of
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and
one count of unlawful possession of a
substance containing less than 2.5 grains of
cannabis. *** Defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence (a cannabis smoking
pipe, a none-hitter" box, and cannabis) found at
his residence during the execution of a valid
search warrant, arguing that his fourth
amendment rights were violated because the
police secured his residence and prevented him
from reentering his residence alone during the
two hours it took to obtain the search warrant.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to
suppress. The State appeals pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (1). 145 Ill. 2d R.
604(a) (1). We affirm.
At the August 1997 hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress, John Love, Sullivan
assistant chief of police, testified that on the
afternoon of April 2, 1997, at the request of
defendant's wife, Tera McArthur, he and
Officer Skidis accompanied her to a trailer
where she and defendant resided, while she
removed her property from the residence. After
she finished removing her belongings, Tera told
Love, who was standing on the porch, that
defendant had "pot" in the trailer under the
couch. Love knocked on the door and, when
defendant answered, Love told him Tera said
he had drugs in the trailer. Defendant denied he
had drugs in the trailer. Defendant also denied
Love's request to search the trailer for the drugs
without a warrant. At that point, defendant was
standing outside the trailer; however, Love did
not recall whether he told defendant to come
out of the trailer or if defendant came out on
his own.
Upon Love's request, Tera told Love she
would testify before a judge about what she had
seen in the trailer. As a result, Love sent her
with Officer Skidis to secure a search warrant
for the residence. Love went back to the porch
and told defendant what was happening. From
that point, Love did not allow defendant to
reenter the trailer unless accompanied by police
so that defendant could not destroy or dispose
of the evidence. Love allowed defendant to
enter the residence on two or three occasions
to get cigarettes and make telephone calls,
during which times Love stepped "right inside
the door and just stood by the doorway the
entire time."
According to the trial court, the search
warrant was issued at 5:05 p.m. When police
returned with the warrant, they entered the
trailer, found cannabis and drug paraphernalia
and placed defendant under arrest. Love
testified that, before this point, no officer had
told defendant he was under arrest, placed him
in handcuffs, or told him he was not free to
leave. Love testified no search of defendant's
residence took place prior to the arrival of the
search warrant.
Defendant testified his wife arrived with
police officers at approximately 3:15 p.m. While
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Tera removed her belongings the police
remained on the porch and did not enter the
trailer. After Tera finished, Love came to the
door and told defendant about Tera's claim that
there was marijuana inside the residence and
that Love asked to search the trailer. Defendant
told Love he could not search without a
warrant. Defendant testified he was outside the
trailer when he heard Love and Tera talking
about obtaining a search warrant and that Tera
agreed to leave to testify, and that he stayed
outside the trailer on the porch until the
warrant came. Love did allow defendant to
enter the trailer to retrieve cigarettes and to
make telephone calls. Love was present but did
not search the trailer at those times. Love told
defendant that he could not wait inside the
trailer by himself, but had to be accompanied
by an officer, until police arrived with the
warrant. Defendant testified that had he been
allowed to go back into his residence alone he
"would have destroyed the marijuana."
Defendant estimated it took police one to
two hours to return with the search warrant.
When they returned with the warrant, he
entered the trailer and showed them where the
drugs were located. After police found the
drugs, they arrested him, searched and
handcuffed him, and advised him of his
Miranda rights. *** While waiting for the search
warrant, police never told defendant he was not
free to leave.
The issue before us is whether the securing
of a dwelling by police for approximately two
hours while awaiting a search warrant, and not
allowing the resident defendant into the
dwelling unless accompanied by an officer to
prevent the removal or destruction of evidence
inside the dwelling, violates defendant's fourth
amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Defendant does not
contest the validity of the search warrant or that
probable cause existed to secure the residence.
A trial court's decision whether to suppress
evidence will not be disturbed on review unless
manifestly erroneous. *** We review this
matter as a question of law to determine
whether defendant's fourth amendment rights
were violated.
A seizure affects an individual's possessory
interests while a search affects his privacy
interests. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
806, 82 L Ed. 2d 599, 609, 104 S. Ct. 3380,
3386 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, J.). A "seizure" occurs when a
meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests occurs. Segura. 468 U.S. at
822, 82 L Ed. 2d at 620. 104 S. Ct. at 3394
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). The fourth
amendment, by its terms, prohibits only
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. U.S.
Const., amend. IV; Segura, 468 U.S. at 806, 82
L Ed. 2d at 609, 104 S. Ct. at 3386 (opinion of
Burger, C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.). A seizure
based upon probable cause that is reasonable
when it commences may become unreasonable
as a result of its duration or other
circumstances. Segura, 468 U.S. at 812, 82 L
Ed. 2d at 613, 104 S. Ct. at 3389 (opinion of
Burger, C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
The State argues that, in Segura, the
Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment permits admission of evidence
found in a dwelling during execution of a valid
search warrant when the police secured the
dwelling from the inside for 19 hours while
awaiting issuance of the search warrant. The
State contends that Segura supports a finding
that the fourth amendment permits admission
of the evidence seized in this case.
In Segura, police arrested petitioner in the
lobby of his apartment building, took him to
his apartment, entered the apartment, and
arrested everyone present. Segura, 468 U.S. at
800-01, 82 L Ed. 2d at 605-06, 104 S. Ct. at
3383 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.). Two
officers remained inside the apartment for 19
hours after the initial entry until the search
warrant was issued and executed, while the
petitioners remained under arrest and in
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custody at police headquarters. Segura, 468 U.S.
at 801, 82 L Ed. 2d at 606, 104 S. Ct. at 3383
(opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.). In a 5 to
4 decision affirming the admission of the
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, the
Court held in part IV (and also restated in part
I) that "securing a dwelling, on the basis of
probable cause, to prevent the destruction or
removal of evidence while a search warrant is
being sought is not itself an unreasonable
seizure of either the dwelling or its contents"
under the fourth amendment. Segura, 468 U.S.
at 810, 82 L Ed. 2d at 612, 104 S. Ct. at 3388
(opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by O'Connor,
J.).
The authority of the Segura decision has
been questioned. See J. Dressler, A Lesson in
Incaution. Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial
Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. United States, 26
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 375 (1985) (hereinafter
Dressler). First, only two justices joined in part
IV of the opinion, and so part IV is not part of
the opinion of the Court. Segura, 468 U.S. at
797, 82 L Ed. 2d at 600, 104 S. Ct. at 3380.
Consequently, neither part IV, nor part I, which
incorporates the holding stated in part IV, is
binding precedent upon lower courts. People v.
Casa!Zra, 144 Ill. 2d 414, 419-20, 581 N.E.2d
651, 654-55, 163 Ill. Dec. 497 (1991); see
Dressler at 416 ("part IV is, in fact, a
concurring opinion by two justices, and can be
deleted without affecting the opinion"). Second,
the Court (in part TV) never determined
whether police effect a seizure of the premises
and its contents within the meaning of the
fourth amendment when they secure a dwelling.
The justices assumed such action constituted a
seizure of the residence and its contents, but in
that case concluded that the seizure was not
unreasonable under the circumstances. Segura,
468 U.S. at 806, 82 L Ed. 2d at 609, 104 S. Ct.
at 3386 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, J.). Nor did the Court express a
view regarding whether securing a dwelling may
"legitimately extend to limiting the freedom of
movement of persons within, into or out of the
impounded premises" (3 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 6.5(c), at 366 (3d ed. 1996)
(hereinafter LaFave)) or if such action
constitutes a seizure or illegal arrest of the
defendant resident. The Court did, however,
seem to limit its holding (part IV) to the
specific facts before it. During the time the
police secured the dwelling from the inside, the
petitioners were under arrest and in police
custody. As a result:
"The actual interference with their possessory
interests in the apartment and its contents was,
thus, virtually nonexistent. *** We are not
prepared to say under these limited
circumstances that the seizure was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
(Emphasis added.) Segura, 468 U.S. at 813, 82 L
Ed. 2d at 614, 104 S. Ct. at 3390 (opinion of
Burger, C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
Both the Segura majority and the dissent
implied that securing a residence from the
outside when probable cause exists may not
violate the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable seizures. Part IV of the
opinion notes that the police in that case would
arguably have been wiser to "secure the
premises from the outside by a 'stakeout' and
that entry into a residence is illegal absent
exigent circumstances even when police have
probable cause and are awaiting a search
warrant. Segura, 468 U.S. at 811-12, 82 L Ed. 2d
at 613, 104 S. Ct. at 3388-89 (opinion of Burger,
C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.). The dissent
acknowledged:
"Since these premises were impounded
'from the inside,' I assume impoundment would
be permissible even absent exigent
circumstances when it occurs 'from the
outside'-when the authorities merely seal off
premises pending the issuance of a warrant but
do not enter." Segura, 468 U.S. at 824 n. 15, 82
L Ed. 2d at 621 n.15, 104 S. Ct. at 3396 n.15
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
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See also LaFave § 6.5(c), at 366 ("all members
of the Court appear to agree that the mere
seizure of the premises and contents (that is, a
mere interference with possessory interests) is
permissible on probable cause even absent
exigent circumstances")
Several conclusions may be derived from
Segura. First, the Court did not address whether
police, when securing a residence, may limit the
"freedom of movement of persons within, into
or out of' the secured premises (LaFave §
6.5(c), at 366). The Court seemed to agree that
the seizure of a residence and its contents is
permissible absent exigent circumstances if
there is probable cause, but that entry into the
residence when securing it requires probable
cause and exigent circumstances. LaFave §
6.5(c), at 366-67. Whatever may be gleaned
from the Segura decision, it did not address
how to handle those cases where "police enter
and incident to the entry either keep persons
entitled to be in the premises under close
scrutiny or else require such persons to leave or
not enter those premises." LaFave § 6.5(c), at
365.
Some courts have upheld the securing of a
residence by police until a search warrant for
the residence is issued. *** [S]ee also LaFave §
6.5(c), at 362 ("some courts have assumed, for
example, that it is permissible for the police to
place a guard outside of premises and to bar
entry during the period in which a search
warrant is being sought or, if persons are
allowed to enter, to prohibit them from taking
items from the premises"). However, cases
where courts have found it permissible for
police to secure a residence from the outside
and to bar persons from entering the residence
while awaiting a search warrant: "typically
involved situations in which the only person or
persons who could have claimed a lawful right
to entry were already in custody or were subject
to arrest if they appeared, or in which the
person who did appear consented to remain
outside." LaFave § 6.5(c), at 362-63.
In Casa!Za, *** the Supreme Court of
Illinois concluded police had no authority to
order persons off a yacht while police awaited a
search warrant. *** Police went to defendants'
yacht and informed the occupants that they
either "could" or "would" obtain a search
warrant and that people on board would have
to leave while the police waited for the search
warrant. *** After police asked one of the
defendants if they could search the yacht, the
defendant asked what would happen if he did
not consent to a search. Police repeated they
could obtain a search warrant and require those
on board to leave while they waited for the
warrant. The defendant then consented to a
search of the yacht. *** In affirming
defendants' motion to suppress the evidence
discovered during the warrantless search of the
yacht, the supreme court concluded the
"police's illegal representation that they had
authority to seize the yacht, the trial court
correctly found, vitiated the voluntariness of
[defendant's] consent to the search." *** The
court also concluded that Segura provided no
authority for defending the police conduct in
that case. *** Similarly in People v. Dale, 301 Ill.
App. 3d 593, 703 N.E.2d 927, 234 Ill. Dec. 827
(1998), the police lacked the authority to order
the defendant to leave his possessions in the
motel room, after evicting him from the room,
when the police had the lock changed and one
officer waited in the lobby while others secured
a search warrant. *** Dale explained that the
Casazza court concluded police lacked the
authority (because Segura did not support it) to
seize premises while awaiting a search warrant.
In People v. Wahlen, 111 Ill. App. 3d 194, 195-
97, 443 N.E.2d 728, 729-30, 66 Ill. Dec. 802
(1982), police arrived with defendant at his
dorm room between 4 and 4:30 on a Sunday
morning and advised him and his roommate
that either the residents could consent to a
search of the dorm room or it would be sealed
off until a search warrant could be obtained, at
least 24 hours later. Both residents gave their
consent to search the room. *** In affirming
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the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to
suppress evidence found in the room because
the residents' consent was coerced, this court
explained: "We know of no authority in the
police to 'seal' a room until a warrant may be
obtained (if it may be obtained at all), and the
time element here is not insignificant." ***
At the heart of this issue is the preservation
of evidence. Clearly, if police secure a dwelling
they prohibit the destruction of the sought-after
evidence. On the other hand, if police do not
secure a dwelling, they risk losing the evidence,
and as defendant testified at the hearing, if
police had not secured his dwelling, he would
have destroyed or disposed of the drugs and
paraphernalia. Another option the police in this
situation had was to bypass obtaining a search
warrant and make a warrantless entry into
defendant's residence to retrieve the evidence,
although the potential that evidence will be
destroyed, alone, is insufficient to justify a
warrantless entry of a home. *** Instead of
searching the residence without a warrant,
police in this case opted to wait for a judge's
determination whether to issue a search warrant
for defendant's residence.
This case does not fall within any of the
three situations when courts have found it
permissible for police to secure a residence
from the outside while seeking a search
warrant. *** Nor is the police conduct in this
case exactly like Casazza or Dale because there
is no evidence the police affirmatively ordered
defendant out of the trailer (and to leave his
belongings) while awaiting the search warrant.
This case represents a situation that Segura did
not address. ***
We find that there was no authority for the
police action in this case. Defendant was inside
his residence when the police came to his door
and he refused to let them search without a
search warrant. While the police were still on
the premises defendant moved from the inside
of his trailer out onto the front porch when
police told him he had to remain outside the
trailer or that he could go inside only if
accompanied by an officer. Though not inside
his residence, defendant was still on his
premises when police refused to let him reenter
the trailer unaccompanied. Even though police
had probable cause to secure the residence
(defendant does not dispute this), the police
conduct amounted to a constructive eviction of
defendant from his residence. This case is
different from a situation in which the
defendant resident is not on the premises when
police arrive to secure the residence from the
outside while seeking a search warrant; that is,
where police, with probable cause, secure a
residence and do not permit anyone arriving at
the premises (from the outside) entrance into
the residence.
Furthermore, the police also secured the
dwelling from the inside when Love followed
defendant into the trailer, and Love physically
entered the trailer to observe defendant and
ensure defendant did not destroy the evidence.
Unlike Segura, where police entered the
dwelling when the defendants were arrested
and in custody, defendant here was not arrested
and Love's entrance into the trailer amounted
to both a meaningful interference with
defendant's possessory interests (a seizure) and
his privacy interests (a search). See Segura, 468
U.S. at 806, 82 L Ed. 2d at 609, 104 S. Ct. at
3386 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, J.) *** Police entry into a residence
absent exigent circumstances (even with
probable cause) is illegal ( Segura, 468 U.S. at
811-12, 82 L Ed. 2d at 613, 104 S. Ct. at 3388-
89 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, J.,)) and no exigent circumstances
here justified Love's entry into the trailer. ***
We conclude the police conduct in securing
defendant's residence while awaiting the search
warrant was an unreasonable seizure (and
probably an unreasonable search) under the
fourth amendment so that the evidence
discovered in the residence upon execution of
the search warrant was properly suppressed.
A person is "seized" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment only when, considering
274
all the circumstances surrounding the encounter
with the police, a reasonable person would have
believed he was not free to leave. *** Whether
he defendant was subjected to threats or a show
of force by police is also a relevant
consideration. * A defendant's subjective
belief that he is under arrest is irrelevant in
determining whether an arrest has occurred, but
the police's intent and whether the defendant
has been told that he is under arrest are
appropriate considerations. ***
It is unclear whether the police effected a
seizure of defendant's person when they
secured his residence and, if so, whether the
seizure was unreasonable. No evidence in the
record indicates the police threatened
defendant or made a physical show of force
toward him. Prior to the police placing
defendant under arrest after conducting the
search pursuant to the warrant, no officer ever
placed him in handcuffs, told him he was under
arrest, or told him he was not free to leave. It
appears that during the time police secured his
residence defendant was free to go anywhere in
the world except back into his trailer by
himself. (However, despite the testimony, it is
questionable whether police would have
allowed defendant to leave the premises and
whether defendant actually felt free to leave
under the circumstances). The securing of
defendant's residence under these
circumstances may have included an
unreasonable seizure of defendant's person as
well. But see LaFave § 6.5(c), at 366 ("to the
extent that a stakeout effects a sort of seizure of
the person of an individual who is thereby
thwarted from gaining entry to the premises, it
is again not remarkable that this may be done
without either a warrant or exigent
circumstances, for neither is necessary for a
more substantial interference with a person--
arrest--occurring off private premises").
We affirm the order of the trial court
granting defendant's motion to suppress
evidence.
Affirmed.
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JUSTICES TO DECIDE POLICE SEARCH-SEIZURE POWER AT
HOMES
Chicago Tribune
Tuesday, May 2, 2000
Associated Press
Taking on a police search-and-seizure case,
the U.S. Supreme Court said Monday that it will
decide whether officers can keep people from
going into their homes alone while police get a
search warrant.
Illinois prosecutors say police needed to
keep a man from destroying marijuana, but he
says officers violated the Constitution's 4th
Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The justices will hear arguments in the case
this autumn. A decision is expected next year.
"Police should not be able to detain you
and keep you from re-entering your own
home," said lawyer Deanne F. Jones,
representing Charles McArthur of Sullivan, Ill.,
in a telephone interview Monday.
Assistant Illinois Atty. Gen. Colleen Griffin
said "there was probable cause to believe he
had this contraband in his house." Therefore,
she added, police were justified in saying that
no one could re-enter the home for the period
of time necessary to secure the warrant.
The dispute began in April 1997 when two
Sullivan police officers accompanied Tera
McArthur to retrieve her belongings from a
trailer home she shared with McArthur, her
husband. When she came outside, she told
police he had marijuana under the couch.
An officer knocked on the door, and
McArthur came outside, denied he had drugs
and told police they could not search without a
warrant. During the two hours it took to get a
warrant, police did not let McArthur re-enter
his home except for a few times when an
officer accompanied him and stood inside the
door.
When an officer returned with a warrant,
police conducted a search and found marijuana
and drug paraphernalia. McArthur was charged
with possessing less than 2.5 grams of
marijuana and possessing drug paraphernalia.
McArthur conceded that if he had been
allowed to go inside his home alone he would
have destroyed the marijuana. But he asked a
state trial judge to bar use of the marijuana as
evidence, contending the officer violated his
4th Amendment rights.
The trial judge ruled the drugs could not be
used as evidence, and an Illinois appeals court
agreed. The charge was a misdemeanor.
"At the heart of this issue is the
preservation of evidence," the appeals court
said.
However, the court said the officers
essentially evicted McArthur from his home,
adding that no special circumstances justified
the officer's entering the trailer with McArthur.
The appellate judges said McArthur's case
was not similar to others in which police were
allowed to keep someone outside while seeking
a warrant. In those cases, the person was under
arrest or subject to arrest on arrival, or the
person consented to stay outside, the court
said.
The prosecutors' appeal to the Supreme
Court said the government had an interest in
keeping McArthur from destroying evidence,
and that the appeals court ruling would make it
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virtually impossible for police to secure homes
in such cases.
"A seizure is not necessarily
unconstitutional for the period of time
necessary to secure the warrant," Griffin said
Monday.
McArthur's lawyers said the officers
unlawfully seized his home and conducted an
illegal search.
"The police not only prohibited Mr.
McArthur from re-entering his home ... but also
admittedly entered Mr. McArthur's residence
despite his telling them they could not come
into his home without a warrant," his lawyers
said in court papers.
Copyright © 2000 Chicago Tribune Compsny
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EDITORIAL: ANOTHER DRUG TEST
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Fiday, May 5, 2000
Can police legally prevent you from entering
your home if they don't have a search warrant -
even if they're pretty sure you're hiding illegal
drugs inside?
This fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear
arguments in a case which may decide how far
such warrantless detentions can go. Their
decision will give another indication whether
the Fourth Amendment really does prevent
unauthorized searches and seizures or is
trumped when the war on drugs is invoked.
In May 1997, Tera McArthur asked Sullivan,
Ill., Police Chief John Love and an officer to
accompany her to the trailer in which she and
her husband Charles lived so that she could
remove her belongings. Charles was inside the
trailer when they arrived.
After removing her things, Tera told Chief
Love that her husband had hidden some
marijuana inside under the couch. The chief
knocked on the door and asked Mr. McArthur
if there were drugs in the trailer. He said no,
and refused to let the police search the
premises without a warrant.
Mrs. McArthur went with the officer to
obtain a warrant. Chief Love remained behind.
While they were gone, Mr. McArthur
stepped outside the trailer. When he tried to re-
enter, Chief Love said no unless he
accompanied Mr. McArthur inside. On a
couple of occasions, the chief stood in the
doorway as Mr. McArthur made phone calls
and got cigarettes.
When the officer returned with the warrant
two hours later, the police searched the trailer,
found 2.5 grams of pot and a small pipe and
arrested Mr. McArthur.
Mr. McArthur asked that the evidence
against him be suppressed, because the time he
was prevented from freely entering his
residence constituted an unconstitutional
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Citing
precedents set by the Illinois Supreme Court
and Illinois law, state trial and appellate courts
ruled in Mr. McArthur's favor and suppressed
the evidence, which should set Mr. McArthur
free.
The state courts correctly ruled that the
police had not legally 'secured' the trailer
because Chief Love never formally ordered Mr.
McArthur to leave the premises and allowed
him to go inside, as long as he was being
watched. The courts also ruled that Mr.
McArthur had reason to believe he had been
illegally detained, because even though he had
not yet been arrested Mr. McArthur wasn't
really free to go wherever he liked.
The state appealed the rulings, saying that the
police should have been able to detain Mr.
McArthur, especially since he admitted that he
would have destroyed the evidence if he had
the chance.
That shouldn't matter. The high court ought
to side with Mr. McArthur. Unfortunately, the
presence of that tiny amount of weed may fog
the judgments of the justices especially Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, who has been
known to sanction almost anything law
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enforcement wants to do to prosecute the drug
war.
Let's hope the justices are thinking clearly.
Copyright ( 2000 DR Partners d/b Las Vegas
Review Journal
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Indianapolis, Indiana v. Edmond
Has Indianapolis Gone Too Far in the War on Drugs?
Meredith Lugo*
As drugs have become increasingly prevalent in our cities, local governments have sought new
ways to combat the crime and violence that often accompany such an increase. The city of Indianapolis,
in such an attempt, set up roadblocks which detained drivers while police conducted a visual search of
the interior of their car and led a drug-sniffing dog around its exterior. The constitutionality of this
roadblock system under the Fourth Amendment was challenged in a class action lawsuit, and struck
down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Writing for the panel majority, Judge Richard Posner placed great emphasis on the use of the
roadblocks as part of a general program of criminal law enforcement, rather than a regulatory program
to protect the health and safety of Indianapolis citizens. Police are permitted to stop cars to protect
highway safety, and detain, for example, drunk drivers. However, the drug roadblocks set up by
Indianapolis do not involve highway safety but instead are a search for criminal evidence. This is
significant, Posner held, because in criminal enforcement the reasonableness of each stop must be
assessed individually, rather than analyzing the reasonableness of the program as a whole. In this
context, Posner continued, the Supreme Court has upheld random searches only when the primary
purpose of the system is not that of apprehending criminals but instead that of promoting safety. Thus,
the Court has upheld sobriety checkpoints at which police checked drivers for being under the
influence of alcohol or other mind-altering drugs (Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 1990) as well
as drivers' license checkpoints, but noted in that case that the Fourth Amendment would be violated if
"the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered in 'plain
view' in the course of a check for driver's licenses" (Texas v. Brown, 1983). Although the Court has
permitted the Border Patrol to implement roadblocks to intercept illegal immigrants (United States v.
Martine-Fuerte, 1976) and customs officials to search the luggage of people entering the United States
(United States v. Ramsey, 1977; United States v. Montgya de Hernande,, 1985), both of which were clearly
programs of criminal law enforcement rather than public safety, Judge Posner distinguishes these
results as depending upon the federal government's sovereign powers over immigration and foreign
commerce. Since the purpose of the roadblock in this case was to catch drug offenders, Judge Posner
found it to be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment as a system of unreasonable searches
unsupported by individualized suspicion.
Judge Frank Easterbrook, in his sharply critical dissent, faulted the majority for ignoring
Supreme Court precedent by injecting a subjective component into its Fourth Amendment analysis. He
contended that the primary purpose of the program is irrelevant; all that matters is what the program
does. According to Easterbrook, the artificial distinction the majority created between regulatory and
criminal enforcement programs is absent from Supreme Court jurisprudence and leads to the illogical
result of the states being more constrained by the Fourth Amendment than the federal government, the
entity the Amendment was originally meant to proscribe.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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Roadblocks and checkpoints are nothing new for the Supreme Court. Most of the cases it has
dealt with, however, have concerned federal immigration power or public safety. It is unclear whether
these precedents will control in the field of drug roadblocks.
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99-1030 Indianapolis, Ind. v. Edmond
Ruling below (Edmond v. Goldsmith, 7" Cir., 183 F.3d 659, 68 U.S.L.W. 1096, 65 Crim. L. Rep. 468):
Suspicionless roadblock violates Fourth Amendment if its purpose is to catch drug offenders by
checking for indicia of drug use or possession, rather than to enhance public safety or promote
efficiency of activity in which detained motorists are engaged.
Question presented: Are checkpoints at which law enforcement officers briefly stop vehicular traffic,
check motorists' licenses and vehicle registrations, look for signs of impairment, and walk narcotics
detection dog around exterior of each stopped automobile unlawful under Fourth Amendment?
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James EDMOND et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
Stephen GOLDSMITH et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided July 7, 1999
POSNER, ChiefJudge:
A class action has been brought to enjoin
the City of Indianapolis from setting up
roadblocks to catch drug offenders, a practice
that the plaintiffs claim violates the Fourth
Amendment. *** The legality of drug
roadblocks has divided the other courts that
have been asked to decide the issue. *** This is
our first case. Because it was decided by the
district court on a very skimpy stipulation of
facts, our ruling on the legality of the City's
program is necessarily tentative.
Six times between August and November
of last year, the City's police department set up
roadblocks on Indianapolis streets to catch
drug offenders. A total of 1,161 cars were
stopped at these roadblocks -- for how long is
unclear but the police endeavor to operate the
checkpoints in such a manner that the stop
does not exceed five minutes. During the stop,
the police demand the driver's license and car
registration, peer through the car's windows
into its interior, and lead a drug-sniffing dog
around the car. The stopping of the 1,161
vehicles resulted in 55 drug-related arrests,
meaning that 5 percent of the total number of
stops resulted in successful drug "hits," and 49
arrests for conduct unrelated to drugs, such as
driving with an expired driver's license, for an
overall hit rate of 9 percent. The City is
continuing the program.
Stopping a car at a roadblock is a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,*** even though the sequel -- the
peering into the car windows and the sniffing
of the car by the dog outside -- does not rise to
the level of a search as that term of the
amendment has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court. *** Whether the seizures
effected by Indianapolis's drug roadblocks are
reasonable may depend on whether
reasonableness is to be assessed at the level of
the entire program or of the individual stop. If
the former, these roadblocks probably are legal,
given the high "hit" rate and the only modestly
intrusive character of the stops. In many Fourth
Amendment contexts, the reasonableness of a
practice is held to depend on the balance
between its benefits (usually nonpecuniary) and
its costs (ditto). *** The benefits of a random
system of searches or seizures, such as vehicle
stops pursuant to a roadblock system, are a
function of, first, the probability that the stop
will result in an arrest or a seizure of
contraband or evidence of crime, and, second,
the gain to the achievement of a lawful
governmental goal that such an arrest or seizure
will produce. The costs are a function of the
harm that the stop will cause to the property or
privacy of the people whose cars are stopped.
In the case of Indianapolis's drug-roadblock
program, the probability of a "hit" is high
(vastly higher than, for example, the probability
of a hit as a result of the screening of
embarking passengers and their luggage at
airports ***), and the deterrence of drug
offenses produced by these hits advances the
strong national, state, and local policy of
discouraging the illegal use of controlled
substances. The cost -- in delay, anxiety, and
invasion of privacy -- to the drivers and
passengers stopped for five minutes at a
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roadblock and subjected to a visual inspection
of the interior and a sniff by a dog is small,
though it is greater than the cost of the normal
airport screening and (like that screening) is
incurred in all stops while the benefit from the
program is obtained only when there is a hit.
But courts do not usually assess
reasonableness at the program level when they
are dealing with searches related to general
criminal law enforcement *** rather than to
primarily civil regulatory programs for the
protection of health, safety, and the integrity of
our borders. *** Because it is infeasible to
quantify the benefits and costs of most law
enforcement programs, the program approach
might well permit deep inroads into privacy. In
high-crime areas of America's cities it might
justify methods of policing that are associated
with totalitarian nations. *** One can imagine
an argument that it would be reasonable in a
drug-infested neighborhood to administer drug
tests randomly to drivers and pedestrians.
Although there is nothing in the text of the
Fourth Amendment to prevent dragnet
searches (read literally, the text requires only
that searches and seizures be "reasonable" and
confines the requirement of "probable cause"
to searches or seizures made pursuant to
warrant), the Supreme Court has insisted that
"to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,"
save m cases of "special need" based on
"concerns other than crime detection." ***
Program-level justifications for searches in
support of specific regulatory programs do not
carry over to general criminal law enforcement.
The qualification in "ordinarily" must not
be overlooked. When the police establish a
roadblock on a route that they know or strongly
suspect is being used by a dangerous criminal to
escape, the probability is high not only of
apprehending the criminal but also of
preventing him from engaging in further
criminal, or otherwise hazardous, activity
incidental to his escape. *** So the roadblock is
allowed even though it is likely to "seize" some
individuals who are not suspected of
wrongdoing.
But here the roadblock is meant to
intercept a completely random sample of
drivers; there is neither probable cause nor
articulable suspicion to stop any given driver.
Even so, we can imagine cases in which,
although the police do not suspect anyone, a
roadblock or other dragnet method of criminal
law enforcement would be reasonable. We may
assume that if the Indianapolis police had a
credible tip that a car loaded with dynamite and
driven by an unidentified terrorist was en route
to downtown Indianapolis, they would not be
violating the Constitution if they blocked all the
roads to the downtown area even though this
would amount to stopping thousands of drivers
without suspecting any one of them of criminal
activity. *** When urgent considerations of the
public safety require compromise with the
normal principles constraining law
enforcement, the normal principles may have to
bend. The Constitution is not a suicide pact.
But no such urgency has been shown here.
The Supreme Court has upheld the validity
of roadblocks in less extreme cases, however,
and it is on these that the City pitches its
defense of its program. The Court upheld
sobriety checkpoints -- roadblocks at which
drivers are checked for being under the
influence of alcohol or (other) mind-altering
drugs -- in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. SitZ
* and roadblocks designed to intercept illegal
immigrants, in United States v. Martine.-Fuerte
***. The Court has not, however, ever held or
stated that all roadblock programs (even those
not vulnerable to a charge of delegating too
much discretion to individual police officers)
are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. On
the contrary, the amendment would be violated
if "the roadblock was a pretext whereby
evidence of narcotics violation might be
uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a
check for driver's licenses." ***
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Randomized search programs have been
upheld that involved the compelled provision
of urine samples for drug testing of law
enforcement officers, jockeys, railroad workers,
and other classes of employee *** as well as
administrative searches conducted without any
basis to suspect any particular individual of
wrongdoing, but rather pursuant to a program
of inspections incidental to a general scheme of
licensing or other regulation. *** But again the
Court has not granted carte blanche.
Many of the cases we have cited do involve
criminal prosecutions, however, and we must
consider how they can be squared with the
principle that the requirement of individualized
suspicion is to be relaxed only on the basis of
(as the Supreme Court said in the Chandler case,
an example of a systematic search program that
did not pass constitutional muster) "concerns
other than crime detection." The answer is that
the concern which lies behind the randomized
or comprehensive systems of inspections or
searches that have survived challenge under the
Fourth Amendment is not primarily with
catching crooks, but rather with securing the
safety or efficiency of the activity in which the
people who are searched are engaged. ***
These measures, moreover, usually make only
limited inroads into privacy, because a person
can avoid being searched or seized by avoiding
the regulated activity, though we hesitate to put
much weight on this point; people are unlikely
to feel they can afford to "ground" themselves
in order to avoid airport searches.
Indianapolis does not claim to be
concerned with protecting highway safety
against drivers high on drugs. Its program of
drug roadblocks belongs to the genre of general
programs of surveillance which invade privacy
wholesale in order to discover evidence of
crime. Imagine if the government set up a metal
detector outside each person's home and
required the person to step through it whenever
he entered or left, in order to determine
whether he was carrying a gun for which he
lacked a permit. A principle that justified a drug
roadblock would justify such surveillance.
We mentioned cases that allow the police or
the Border Patrol to set up roadblocks to
intercept illegal immigrants, a form of
"contraband" to which illegal drugs might be
analogized. Other cases allow custom searches
of the luggage of people entering the United
States. *** But such cases depend ultimately on
sovereign powers over foreign relations, foreign
commerce, citizenship, and immigration
that states and cities do not possess. Martine-
Fuerte involved searches well inland from the
border, but the Court emphasized the
infeasibility of preventing illegal immigration by
border checks alone. ***
We are mindful of the paradoxical
implication that the Fourth Amendment,
though originally limited to federal law
enforcement, may pinch the states more tightly.
But the paradox need not detain us.
Indianapolis makes no attempt to defend its
roadblocks on the basis that it is trying to
exclude a harmful substance or dangerous
persons. Though that may be the ultimate aim,
the City concedes that its proximate goal is to
catch drug offenders in the hope of
incapacitating them, and deterring others, by
criminal prosecution. The program has no
regulatory purpose that might be compared to
that of the immigration laws, which seek to
exclude and deport illegal immigrants rather
than just to prosecute them for criminal
violations of the immigration laws.
It is true that in the course of looking for
drugs in vehicles stopped at its drug
roadblocks, the Indianapolis police often
discover violations of the traffic laws. If the
purpose of the roadblock program were to
discover such violations, and if a program
having such a purpose could be justified under
the cases that allow searches and seizures
without individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing, then the seizure, in the course of
such searches, of drugs that were in plain view
would be lawful. *** But the first "if' has not
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been shown. It is necessary in this regard to
distinguish between two kinds of purpose, that
of the program's designers and that of the
police officers manning the roadblocks. The
test for the lawfulness of a particular search or
seizure is an objective one; the motives of the
officer carrying out the search or seizure are
irrelevant. *** But the purpose behind the
program is critical to its legality. The program
must be a bona fide effort to implement an
authorized regulatory policy rather than a
pretext for a dragnet search for criminals. ***
"The exemption from the need for probable
cause (and warrant), which is accorded to
searches made for the purpose of inventory or
administrative regulation, is not accorded to
searches that are not made for those purposes."
*** Leading a drug-sniffing dog around a car
cannot be justified by reference to a desire to
detect traffic violations, and so the use of the
dog at the City's roadblocks shows -- what is
anyway not contested -- that the purpose of the
roadblocks is to catch drug offenders. We are
not asked to decide whether, if the primary
purpose were to detect drunken drivers, the
dog could be added to the roadblock scenario
on the theory that since a sniff is not a search,
the incremental invasion of privacy would be
negligible, or at least would not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
It can be objected that requiring
consideration of purpose injects too large an
element of uncertainty into the interpretation of
the amendment, and that purpose may be
difficult to determine when it is corporate in
nature. But law like politics is the art of the
possible and often requires imperfect
compromises. Inquiry into purpose is one
method of identifying and banning the most
flagrantly abusive governmental conduct
without handcuffing government altogether.
The alternative would be to rule that either all
roadblocks are illegal or none are, which would
be akin to punishing all killings identically
because the "objective" fact is that someone
has died.
To summarize, we have identified four
exceptions to the principle that a search or
seizure is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment
unless there is a basis for believing that a
particular search or seizure, as distinct from a
program of universal or randomized searches
or seizures, will yield evidence or fruits or
instrumentalities of crime. The first exception,
illustrated by the roadblock set up to catch a
fleeing criminal, is where there is a suspect --
the police have identified the criminal and have
only to find him -- but it is infeasible to avoid
an indiscriminate search or seizure of other
persons, persons not suspected of crime, as
well. The second exception, illustrated by the
hypothetical dynamite case, is where no specific
person is under suspicion but the circumstances
make it impossible to prevent a crime without
an indiscriminate search. The third exception is
the regulatory search, the objective of which is
to protect a specific activity rather than to
operate as an adjunct to general criminal law
enforcement. The last exception is the
prevention of illegal importation whether of
persons (a power limited to the federal
government ***) or of goods. On the basis of
the record compiled in the preliminary-
injunction proceedings -- a record essentially
limited to the parties' stipulation of facts -- the
Indianapolis roadblock program has not been
shown to fit any of these exceptions, and thus
the lawfulness of the program has not, as the
district judge believed, been established. As that
was the only ground on which she denied the
preliminary injunction, her order cannot stand.
Whether there may be other grounds for
denying the preliminary injunction, or whether
on a fuller record the Indianapolis program
might pass Fourth Amendment muster, are
issues for the district court to decide in the first
instance. We are not enthusiastic about the use
of the Constitution to squelch experiments in
dealing with serious social problems. The high
hit rate of Indianapolis's roadblock scheme
suggests that Indianapolis has placed the
roadblocks in areas of the city in which drug
use approaches epidemic proportions; and if so
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the roadblocks might be justified by reference
to the second exception, as illustrated by such
cases as Maxwell (involving a flurry of drive-by
shootings), Norwood (threat of violence at a rally
of motorcycle gangs), and Williams (Indian
insurrection). But this is not argued either.
REVERSED
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Roadblocks in Indianapolis check for both
driving and drug offenses. Someone driving a
car without a license, or with drugs, can expect
arrest. The program is spectacularly successful
as roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are
arrested, with the reason equally divided
between driving and drug crimes. Roadblocks
with much lower rates of success have been
held consistent with the fourth amendment. ***
Yet my colleagues declare that the fourth
amendment forbids what Indianapolis has
done, because its primary purpose is to enforce
the criminal laws. MartineZ-Fuerte approved a
roadblock to search for alien smuggling, a
violation of a criminal law; Sit approved a
roadblock to search for drunk driving, a
violation of a criminal law. So how can the fact
that possessing drugs violates the criminal laws
doom this program? One would suppose that
our case is afortiori from Sit, because alcohol,
marijuana, and cocaine all are drugs, any of
which can impair a driver's performance. If the
Constitution allows a roadblock to intercept
alcohol users, how can it condemn a roadblock
to intercept marijuana and cocaine users?
My colleagues' answer is that everything
depends on the "primary" or "real" motive for
the roadblock. Thus if Indianapolis set out to
find people driving without licenses and only
later added a dog to sniff for drugs (a step that
does not entail a search or seizure of any kind
*** in cars that already were stopped, then the
program would pass constitutional muster. But
if the City first decides to search for drugs, then
adds license checks to make better use of the
time while the dog does its work, then the
program is invalid. If a city starts a license +
drug program, then its validity depends on the
primary motivation: if to search for people not
legally entitled to drive, the program is valid; if
to search for people not legally entitled to carry
drugs, invalid. If a program is designed
primarily to search for people using drugs in the
car, and only secondarily to locate drugs in the
trunk, then it is valid; if it is designed primarily
to search for carried drugs, and only secondarily
for ingested drugs, then it is invalid.
Why should the constitutionality of a
roadblock program turn on what its promoters
think (or the order in which its components
were approved), rather than on what happens
to the citizenry? Over and over, the Supreme
Court says that the reasonableness inquiry
under the fourth amendment is objective; it
depends on what the police do, not on what
they want or think. *** The majority believes
that things are otherwise when a program's
design is in issue: "the purpose behind the
program is critical to its legality. The program
must be a bona fide effort to implement an
authorized regulatory policy rather than a
pretext for a dragnet search for criminals." ***
Where does "purpose" come into the fourth
amendment? Not from its text; reasonableness
fairly screams an objective inquiry. Not from its
history; my colleagues do not mention the
amendment's genesis. Not from the Supreme
Court's cases. None of the opinions my
colleagues cites requires a tour through the
heads of the programs' sponsors. None
suggests that the Constitution blesses a
program in which a criminal-investigation
component is added to a regulatory-
enforcement one, while condemning an
identical program in which the criminal-
investigation component comes first. When the
Supreme Court speaks of "regulatory"
programs, such as the searches of business
premises *** it asks what the programs do, not
what the sponsors of the programs had in mind.
So far as the fourth amendment is concerned,
there is no difference between a roadblock
originally designed to catch drug peddlers and
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also used to catch drunk drivers, and a
roadblock originally designed to catch drunk
drivers and also used to catch drug peddlers.
Only observable differences in police behavior
enter into the calculus of "reasonableness."
To be consistent, therefore, my colleagues
should say that the fourth amendment would
not permit the Michigan Department of State
Police to add a drug-detection dog to the
roadblock program sustained in SitZ. That
conclusion would be so jarring, given received
doctrine that a dog's sense of smell is not a
search and requires no justification, that it
could not be sustained. Yet if a dog may be
added to the program sustained in Sitz, it can't
matter to "reasonableness" whether some of
the program's sponsors thought the dog more
important than the breathalyzer. The trial
envisaged by my colleagues -- one at which
officials of Indianapolis will testify about their
motivations in approving the roadblock
program, and the district judge must make
credibility findings to resolve the fourth
amendment objection -- has no relation to the
objective standard that a "reasonableness"
benchmark demands.
What has led the majority to its search for
the "primary purpose" behind a program, and
thus to the startling conclusion that a given
program may be constitutional or not today
depending on what the Mayor thought last year,
is its belief that "program-level justifications for
searches . . . do not carry over to general
criminal law enforcement." *** Indianapolis has
adopted a program that is objectively
reasonable given its minimal intrusion and
substantial success ***, but my colleagues say
that only "regulatory" programs may be
justified in this manner. Without a distinction
between criminal and regulatory searches, it
would be impossible to understand Camara v.
Municipal Court, ***, which holds that a warrant
may be issued without probable cause, despite
the text of the fourth amendment, provided the
government really isn't looking for anything in
particular. But none of the Supreme Court's
cases equates "regulatory search" with
"regulatory purpose"; the Court's line is objective,
while my colleagues' is subjective.
For every statement suggesting that
criminal law enforcement may not be justified
at the program level, it is easy to find another to
the contrary -- often in the same opinion. For
example, my colleagues quote a few words
from Chandler v. Miller, ***. That very opinion
contains this passage ***: "Searches conducted
without grounds for suspicion of particular
individuals have been upheld, however, in
'certain limited circumstances.' *** These
circumstances include brief stops for
questioning or observation at a fixed Border
Patrol checkpoint, United States v. Martinet-
Fuerte, ***, or at a sobriety checkpoint, Michigan
Dept. of State Police v. Sity ***, and administrative
inspections in 'closely regulated' businesses,
***". This treats the roadblock and regulatory
cases as independent, undermining the
proposition that roadblocks are improper when
they seek evidence of crime. Consider what
Brown v. Texas, ***, had to say: "the Fourth
Amendment requires that a seizure must be
based on specific, objective facts indicating that
society's legitimate interests require the seizure
of the particular individual, or that the seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers." (Emphasis
added.) Lots of avowedly criminal searches are
justified at a program level. After making a
custodial arrest, the police may conduct a
complete search of the person, including the
contents of any packages he may be carrying.
*** After entering a dwelling to make an arrest,
police may conduct a visual "protective sweep"
of other rooms to ensure that armed occupants
there do not pose a risk. *** The list of
searches and seizures justified in the aggregate,
without regard to person-specific cause, is quite
long. Roadblocks are just another example. ***
Interpretation of the fourth amendment is
not a model of intellectual consistency. ***
Cases create oodles of cubbyholes. My
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colleagues want to take as a fundamental
doctrine that criminal investigations require
person-specific cause, and conform all fourth
amendment law to it. I suppose one could go in
a different direction and treat auto searches or
housing inspections as the paradigm. But our
job as an inferior court is not to pick favorite
passages from the hundreds of fourth
amendment opinions the Supreme Court has
issued, but to apply the principles devised for
the most closely analogous cases. This is a
roadblock case. To figure out how to handle a
roadblock case, we must look at how the
Supreme Court has handled other roadblock
cases.
Neither SitZ nor MartineZ-Fuerte involved a
regulatory inspection, yet in each the Court
assessed reasonableness at the program level.
Michigan searched for drunk driving and the
United States for alien smuggling. Because both
programs were designed to enforce the criminal
laws, a simple criminal-regulatory distinction
won't fly. This impels my colleagues to
proclaim a multivariate approach under which
the reasonableness of criminal investigations
will be assessed at the program level if some
other condition holds -- if there is a really
pressing need (the search for a terrorist), if the
reason for the stop is closely related to the
dangers of driving (the search for drunk
drivers), if the stop is justified by some
"special" governmental power. So much for the
organizing principle with which the majority
begins. Why use a principle that disintegrates at
first application?
Neither Sit. nor Martine.-Fuerte uses the
approach my colleagues devise. Let's work
through the line of reasoning that actually
appears in these opinions.
First, the privacy interest of drivers is
diminished relative to the interests of people at
home or in the office. *** Recognition that
drivers have a diminished expectation of
privacy is missing from my colleagues' opinion.
Instead they analogize a roadblock to a
program under which "the government set up a
metal detector outside each person's home and
required the person to step through it whenever
he entered or left, in order to determine
whether he was carrying a gun for which he
lacked a permit. A principle that justified a drug
roadblock would justify such surveillance." ***
No, it wouldn't; the special treatment of
automobiles provides a stopping point. One
may question this treatment as an original
matter, but it is entrenched in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence and is the key to
analyzing roadblocks.
Second, the invasion of privacy at a
roadblock is slight. Detention is short, the
search superficial. Indeed, the use of a dog is
not a "search" at all. A roadblock administered
the way Indianapolis handles its program is less
intrusive than the search of one's person and
belongings at an airport, another familiar kind
of "roadblock" (and one that, like the
Indianapolis program, is designed to find
evidence of crime, such as carrying weapons
aboard an aircraft). Cases since SitZ and
Marine Z-Fuerle describe roadblocks in these
terms -- as reasonable in light of the minimal
intrusion, not because they are "regulatory" or
conducted with an approved "motive."
Third, a small invasion can be justified by
aggregate success. "Probable cause," the level of
suspicion adequate to support a custodial arrest
that may last for days, is something less than a
50% likelihood; "reasonable suspicion," enough
to support a frisk, means substantially less than
"probable cause," ***; and as a brief stop is less
intrusive than a frisk, an even lower probability
of detecting crime suffices. MartineZ-Fuerte holds
a probability under 1% will do for a roadblock,
and in Indianapolis the probability is much
greater. (The probability of finding a bomb in
an airport search must be less than one in ten
million, given the volume of air traffic, but
judges think this sufficient given the gravity of
the evil being detected. Can my colleagues
believe that drugs are so harmless that a 5%
detection rate makes a search unreasonable
even when the intrusion is slight?)
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Fourth, the principal risk in allowing stops
of vehicles without person-specific cause is that
the officers will abuse the discretion thus
conveyed. *** Indianapolis was at pains to
establish a rigorous protocol for its stops.
Roadblocks are fixed; the number of cars
selected for inspection is fixed; the procedure
following a stop is fixed. ***
Because Martine <-Fuerte so clearly involves
criminal law enforcement, the majority creates
still another special rule: "such cases depend
ultimately on sovereign power over foreign
relations, foreign commerce, citizenship, and
immigration". *** Any implication that the
Court in Martine-Fuerte relied on such a special
power would be incorrect. The checkpoints
were between 65 and 90 miles inland. The
Court's point was not that Congress has extra
powers to conduct domestic searches for aliens,
but that "traffic-checking practices . . .
appropriately are subject to less stringent
constitutional safeguards." *** Although
MartineZ-Fuerte involved immigration, never did
the Court say that enforcement of this body of
laws should be especially easy. ***
Treating MarineZ-Fuerte as exemplifying a
"border exception" or "immigration exception"
to normal fourth amendment principles turns
that amendment on its head. *** Inland
searches based on the national government's
power over immigration and importation
(Martiney-Fuerte was not a border search) should
be evaluated under the fourth amendment's
normal "reasonableness" standard; instead my
colleagues treat the immigration power as a
reason to reduce the force of the fourth
amendment. As a side effect, the national
government, the object of the fourth
amendment, winds up with greater freedom to
conduct searches and seizures than state and
local governments, which have been brought
within the fourth amendment only indirectly.
Any approach that carries this "paradoxical
implication" *** must be rejected. Giving the
national government more leeway than the
states to conduct searches, and treating
immigration and customs searches as especially
easy to justify, are so at war with the text and
history of the Constitution that they cannot be
sustained.
Searches by the national government pose a
serious threat to the citizenry; searches by local
governments pose less, because movement
within the country is easy. Some cities enforce
their drug laws by heavy reliance on spies,
infiltrators, informers, turncoats, wiretaps, and
nighttime searches where battering rams smash
through doors; others may substitute more civil
methods, such as roadblocks where the only
imposition is a five-minute wait with man's best
friend outside. Which of these is most like the
"methods of policing that are associated with
totalitarian nations" ***? Police and prosecutors
today ply people with favors so that friends and
family become informers; lying about their
identity, agents wheedle their way into
strangers' confidences; they search trash in the
hope of finding an incriminating scrap. Scaling
back these tactics (none of which requires
person-specific justification) in favor of
roadblocks would make enforcement of the
drug laws a good deal more reasonable. Or so
at least the people may conclude.
One glory of a federal society is that the
people may choose for themselves not only
laws but also law-enforcement methods. State
A may employ extra police to follow a high-
probability-of-detection and low-sentence
approach; State B may choose fewer police,
fewer intrusions on privacy, but higher
sentences for those who are caught. Each may
be reasonable. Indianapolis selected a
roadblock system, one that may catch any of its
drivers. If this strikes the wrong balance, the
people may throw out of office those who
adopted it. Given the modest intrusion that
roadblocks create for personal privacy, this is a
legitimate choice for the public to make. The
real threat to civil liberties comes from the
national government, not from law-
enforcement variations that can be avoided by
driving a few miles to the east or west. Local
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governments should have more, not less,
leeway than does the national government to
decide how the trade-off between privacy and
effective law enforcement shall be handled.
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JUSTICES TO REVIEW POLICE 'NARCOTICS CHECKPOINTS'
Supreme Court Will Consider Reinstituting Indianapolis Poicy. Law
Enforcement Officials Say Effect on Motorists Not Canrying Drugs is
MinimaL
Los Angeles Times
Wednesday, February 23, 2000
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court, which already has
given law enforcement broad powers to fight
the war on drugs, agreed Tuesday to consider
reviving a police policy of using routine
roadblocks to check for narcotics.
A case from Indianapolis, to be heard in the
fall, is the first to test the constitutionality of
"narcotics checkpoints."
If the city prevails, local and state police will
have the option of using these roadblocks
widely or just in high-crime areas.
Police say the impact on innocent motorists
is minimal. They are stopped and questioned
for several minutes while a drug-sniffing dog
circles the vehicle. If the motorist is alert and
no drugs are found, the car is sent on its way,
officials said.
During the summer of 1998, police mi
Indianapolis set up these drug roadblocks at
several locations around the city. Police said 9%
of the stops resulted in an arrest.
But the drug roadblocks were challenged by
two motorists as a violation of their 4th
Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Last year, the U.S. Court
of Appeals in Chicago agreed in a 2-1 vote and
declared the policy unconstitutional.
Police may stop cars for safety reasons,
such as detecting drunk drivers, wrote Judge
Richard Posner. But since the drug roadblocks
do not involve highway safety, but rather are a
search for criminal evidence, a policy of
randomly searching innocent persons is
unconstitutional, he concluded. A renowned
antitrust expert, Posner is now mediating the
dispute between Microsoft and the Justice
Department.
In their appeal, lawyers for Indianapolis
noted that the high court in the past had upheld
"sobriety roadblocks" as well as the
immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 north
of San Diego. In both instances, innocent
persons are stopped briefly. Narcotics
checkpoints are similar and also should be
upheld, they argued.
In a brief order, the Supreme Court
announced Tuesday it will hear the case of City
of Indianapolis vs. Edmond, 99-1030.
Since the mid-1980s, the court regularly has
sided with law enforcement in drug cases. For
example, the justices upheld the use of "drug
courier profiles," which are used as a basis to
stop people in airports and train depots.
Four years ago, the court ruled that police
can use minor traffic offenses, such as failing to
stop completely at a stop sign, as a pretext to
pull over a vehicle to search for drugs. Once
the car is stopped, the police can force the
motorist and passengers to step out and then
search the entire vehicle.
Critics say that thanks to these rulings, the
police power to enforce traffic laws has been
transformed into a general police power to
search for drugs on the roadways. Moreover,
this search authority has been used
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disproportionately against black and Latino
motorists, civil libertarians say.
In other actions Tuesday, the court:
* Agreed to decide whether a state high
school athletic association can prohibit private
schools from recruiting star athletes.
The legal question before the court tests
whether these regulatory bodies are private or
public. If they are public, then the regulators
must abide by the Constitution, including its
guarantee of freedom of speech.
The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Assn. says it is a private group, even though
most of its members are public high schools.
The Brentwood Academy, a football
powerhouse in Memphis, says it has a free-
speech right to recruit student athletes. The
outcome in the case of Brentwood Academy vs.
TSSAA, 99-901, could broadly affect the
regulation of school sports.
* Heard arguments in the continuing tax
fraud prosecution of Webster L. Hubbell, the
former associate of the Clintons and a onetime
high-ranking Justice Department official. The
case is one of several begun by Whitewater
independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr, who
resigned recently.
After Hubbell was given immunity and
ordered to turn over his business records,
Starr's office indicted him for tax fraud.
In skeptical questioning Tuesday, the
justices called Starr's actions "deceptive" and
said they signaled "prosecutorial overreaching."
A ruling in U.S. vs. Hubbell, 99-166, will be
handed down by July.
Copyright C 2000 Times Mirror Company
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TRAFFIC STOPS CASE TO BE HEARD BY SUPREME COURT
The Indiana Lawyer
Wednesday, March 1, 2000
Rick Thacketay
Attorneys on both sides of an Indianapolis-
based Fourth Amendment dispute are
preparing for a final showdown, following word
the U.S. Supreme Court will hear the case next
term.
The Supreme Court issued a writ of
certiorari last week in Indianapolis v. Edmond
(99-1030), clearing the way for oral arguments
this fall on the city's challenge to a U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 7th Circuit decision.
At issue is whether police officers are
permitted, under the Constitutional protections
against illegal search and seizure, to set-up
traffic checkpoints to screen-out vehicles they
suspect maybe be transporting illegal drugs.
The July 1999 ruling by the 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned an earlier decision
by U.S. District Court Judge Sarah Evans
Barker, of Indiana's Southern District,
Indianapolis division. The appeals court ruled
2-1 (udges Richard Posner and Diane Wood,
yes; Judge Frank Esterbrook, no) that Barker
was wrong in her determination the roadblocks
didn't violate the Constitution.
The program centered around a series of
checkpoints started in 1998. Five at a time,
randomly selected groups of cars were stopped
from traffic, where police would check drivers'
licenses and registrations, as if pulled-over for
any moving violation. While the officers'
checked the information, others would walk
drug-sniffing dogs around the parked vehicle to
check for illegal narcotics. If the dogs
responded to a scent, a search would be
conducted of the car.
In the first four months random stops were
conducted, the program yielded 104 arrests, 55
drug-related from the 1,161 vehicles stopped
statistics city law enforcers point to saying the
end justifies the means.
With the support of the Indiana Civil
Liberties Union (ICLU), James Edmond and
Joell Palmer, who were stopped by the
checkpoints, challenged those means as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
ICLU's Kenneth Falk will represent
Edmond and Palmer before the Supreme Court
this fall. Falk will be fresh-off another case he's
followed to the nation's highest court, United
States v. French. He will represent a former
Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate in a case
which questions the constitutionality of a
federal law limiting the ability of inmates to
bring litigation against states over unsuitable
prison conditions. Scheduled to present
arguments in that case April 18, Falk hasn't
finalized his strategy for his Edmond
presentation.
The court has held that roadblocks
designed to flush-out drunk drivers (Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz) and
smuggling illegal immigrants (United States v.
Martines-Fuerte) are allowable under the
Constitution, which Falk accepts. He holds,
however, that road blocks designed to stall
drivers long enough to allow dogs time to smell
their property violates protections against illegal
search and seizure.
"Drug road blocks are designed for one
purpose to hold a person long enough for a
dog to sniff-out illegal drugs, not to remove an
unsafe car from the road," Falk said. "Courts
have held if you're going to conduct a search
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and seizure, there has to be a cause drug
roadblocks go over that line."
The city's case started under the leadership
of Steve Carter, Indianapolis' city-county
counsel under former Mayor Steven
Goldsmith. New corporation counsel Scott
Chinn believes the case has a different priority
level for his boss, Mayor Bart Peterson. "This
administration comes to the issue with fresh
eyes (but) made the decision to push for a
definitive ruling from the court," Chinn said.
"I'm not sure how the prior administration view
(traffic stops). This administration (wouldn't
use) drug interdiction checkpoints as an end in
themselves.
However, Chinn still thinks the case asks
questions that, based on the court's decision to
hear it, are important enough call for the
Supreme Court's opinion.
"We need to know whether something like
this can be an arrow in the quiver of law
enforcement. That's something the court is
going to decide," Chinn said.
Two sides will negotiate a timetable for the
case with the court. City attorneys will have 45
days to file a brief, followed by a 30 day
window for the appellee to file a brief.
Arguments will be scheduled by the court over
the summer.
Copyright C 2000 IBJ Corporation
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Gail ATWATER v. City of LAGO VISTA
Buckle up... or else.
David P. Primack*
If someone told you that you might be taken forcefully from your car, handcuffed in front of
your children, and detained in jail all for failing to wear a car seatbelt, you probably would not believe it.
Such was the experience, however, for Gail Atwater who was pulled over and arrested in Lago Vista,
Texas for failure to wear a seatbelt. Testing the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizures, the United States Supreme Court's verdict might have far-
reaching consequences for some 190 million licensed drivers in the United States.
At the heart of the dispute is a Texas statute which allows, but does not require, a police officer
to arrest a person without a warrant who operates a motor vehicle without wearing a seatbelt. In this
particular case, according to her Supreme Court petition, Gail Atwater was returning from soccer
practice with her two children, driving down a residential street when her son's toy fell out from their
truck. Turning around, Atwater drove down the street at about 15 miles per hour looking for the
missing plaything. The Atwaters unbuckled their seatbelts to gain a better view of the ground from the
vehicle. Seeing this, Lago Vista police officer, Bart Turek, stopped the truck, approached, and began
yelling at Atwater about their seatbelt violations. When Atwater told the police officer to stop yelling
because he was frightening the children, Turek decided to arrest her. A neighbor who was present took
the children while Atwater was handcuffed and taken to jail. Eventually, she pleaded no contest to the
seatbelt violations. Atwater then filed suit against the city of Lago Vista challenging the
constitutionality of the arrest.
Although a United States District Court Judge dismissed Atwater's complaint, a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, labeling Officer Turek's actions
"indefensible." The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and in a 11-6 decision affirmed the district
court's decision.
Writing for the en banc majority, Judge Emilio Garza stated that when determining the
constitutionality of an arrest, the court must "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged
to justify the intrusion." (quoting Tennessee v. Garner (1985)) If the arrest is based on probable cause
then the government's interest almost always outweighs the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. The
exception to this is when the arrest is conducted in an "extraordinary" manner. In this case, Officer
Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater and the Court concluded that he did not conduct the arrest
in an "extraordinary manner."
The majority's conclusions provoked some vigorous dissents. Judge Jacques Wiener, in his
dissent, focused on the unreasonableness of Office Turek's actions. He stated that there are three
considerations to determine the permissibility of an arrest: the importance of the government's interest,
the degree of certainty that the seizure will further that interest, and the extent of any infringement on
the targeted individual's constitutional rights. The majority, according to Judge Weiner, concentrated
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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solely on the second of these considerations to the exclusion of the others. Turek had a legitimate
reason to fine Atwater, but no legitimate reason to arrest her, since there was no risk of flight nor a
need to protect the community. Hence, according to Judge Wiener, the arrest was an unconstitutional
infringement of her Fourth Amendment rights.
Judge James Dennis, in his dissent, concentrated on whether the Fourth Amendment
incorporated "the common law at the time it was framed, prohibit[ed], as an unreasonable seizure, the
warrantless full custodial arrest" of a fine-only criminal misdemeanor. The common law prohibited a
warrantless arrest of an individual unless it involved a breach of the peace, as in "violent or disorderly
acts." Judge Dennis concluded that Atwater's conduct did not rise to that level, and therefore the arrest
was unconstitutional as understood by the original interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
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99-1408 Atwater v. Lago Vista, Tex.
Ruling below (5h Cir. (en banc), 195 F.3d 242, 66 Crim. L. Rep. 176):
Civil rights plaintiffs arrest for misdemeanor violation of seat-belt law was supported by probable
cause, was not conducted in manner that was unusually harmful to her privacy or physical interest, and,
therefore, did not violate Fourth Amendment ; plaintiff waived issue of whether Fourth Amendment,
interpreted in light of common law extant at amendment's adoption, limits circumstances under which
misdemeanant may be arrested without warrant.
Question presented: Does Fourth Amendment limit use of custodial arrests for fine-only traffic
offenses?
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Gail ATWATER, Individually; and Michael Haas, Dr, As next friend of
Anya Savannah Haas and Mackinley Xavier Haas, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
CITY OF LAGO VISTA; Bart Turek; and Frank Miller, Chief Police
Lago Vista, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
Decided, November 24, 1999
GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Gail Atwater
("Atwater") and Michael Haas ("Haas"), as next
friend of Anya Savannah Haas and Mackinley
Xavier Haas, appealed the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-
Appellees Officer Bart Turek ("Officer Turek"),
Police Chief Frank Miller ("Chief Miller"), and
the City of Lago Vista. A panel of this court
reversed in part and remanded. *** We vacated
the panel opinion *** and granted rehearing en
banc.
I
Officer Turek arrested Gail Atwater for
failing to wear her seat belt, failing to fasten her
children in seat belts, driving without a license,
and failing to provide proof of insurance.
Officer Turek handcuffed Atwater and took her
to jail, where she spent approximately one hour.
Atwater appeared before a magistrate and was
released after posting bond.
Atwater and her husband, Haas,
subsequently brought various federal and state
law claims against Officer Turek, Chief Miller,
and the City of Lago Vista, arising out of
Atwater's arrest. Officer Turek, Chief Miller
and the City of Lago Vista moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted this
motion.
A panel of this court reversed the district
court's summary judgment with respect to
Atwater's Fourth Amendment unreasonable
seizure claim against Officer Turek and the City
of Lago Vista and concluded that Officer Turek
was not entitled to qualified immunity. *** We
granted rehearing en banc to reconsider the
panel decision.
II
To determine the constitutionality of an
arrest, "we must balance the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion." *** If an arrest is based on probable
cause then "with rare exceptions ... the result of
that balancing is not in doubt." *** In other
words, when probable cause exists to believe
that a suspect is committing an offense, the
government's interests in enforcing its laws
outweigh the suspect's privacy interests, and an
arrest of the suspect is reasonable. ***
We deviate from this principle--that an
arrest based on probable cause is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment--only when an
arrest is "conducted in an extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or even physical interests." *** For
Atwater advances an alternative argument for
the first time in her en banc brief. She argues that
in determining whether her arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment, we should follow the
common law rule that existed when the Fourth
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example, it is "necessary actually to perform" a
balancing analysis notwithstanding the existence
of probable cause when a search or seizure
involves deadly force, an unannounced entry
into a home, entry into a home without a
warrant, or physical penetration of the body.
After reviewing the record, we conclude
that Officer Turek had probable cause to arrest
Atwater and that he did not conduct the arrest
in such an "extraordinary manner." Neither
party disputes that Officer Turek had probable
cause to arrest Atwater. Atwater admits that she
was not wearing her seat belt and that she had
not belted in her children. Operating a motor
vehicle without wearing a seat belt violates
Texas law, and Officer Turek had discretion to
arrest Atwater without a warrant, see ***United
States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995)
("Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists
when the totality of facts and circumstances
within a police officer's knowledge at the
moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable
person to conclude that the suspect had
Amendment was promulgated, which she
claims limited the circumstances under which a
misdemeanant could be arrested without a
warrant. She did not raise this argument before
the district court or the panel that initially
considered this case. Instead, the panel
considered this argument sua sponte, and even
though it ruled in Atwater's favor, it declined to
do so based on the common law rule. ***
Because Atwater did not properly raise this
argument previously, she has waived her right
to pursue this issue here. ***
Moreover, Atwater is unable to cite any cases
where courts have invoked the common law
rule to invalidate warrantless misdemeanor
arrests otherwise supported by probable cause.
Indeed, the cases uniformly uphold warrantless
misdemeanor arrests where probable cause
exists, even where variants of the common law
standards to which Atwater refers are
incorporated into state law and raised before
the court. ***
committed or was committing an offense.").
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record
that Officer Turek conducted the arrest in an
"extraordinary manner, unusually harmful" to
Atwater's privacy interests. *** The only
physical contact between Officer Turek and
Atwater occurred when he placed her in
handcuffs. Atwater admits that she did not
suffer any physical harm during or as a result of
the arrest. We therefore conclude that, because
it was based on probable cause and because it
was not conducted in the above-described
"extraordinary manner," Officer Turek's arrest
of Atwater was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
III
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
court's summary judgment.
district
DISSENT:
GARZA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I believe that the original opinion of the
panel that I was on *** is sufficient to show
that the seizure and handcuffing of Mrs.
Atwater in this case was unreasonable and
uncalled for.
I write separately in dissent because I
believe that our colleagues in the majority are
wrong in not dividing an arrest or a stop and a
seizure of the person arrested or stopped.
We have of necessity to keep in mind that
this was a traffic stop or arrest of Mrs. Atwater
for failure to have her seatbelt or her children's
seatbelts on when stopped. As pointed out by
my colleague, Judge Parker, and author of the
original opinion, Mrs. Atwater's seatbelt offense
was a misdemeanor for which she could be
fined up to $ 50 and no more. Her offense
would in no way have been a danger to any one
else, but herself and her children.
I have been a Texas lawyer for over sixty
years and an Article III Federal Judge in Texas
for over thirty-eight years. I think that I can
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take judicial notice of the fact that in a regular
traffic stop; when a person runs a red light,
makes a wrong turn, is speeding, or in this case
is not wearing a seatbelt, the usual procedure
for the officer making the stop or the arrest is
to give the accused a citation, which shows the
charge against the person driving the car, a
notice to appear before a municipal judge on a
certain day at a certain time and signed by the
accusing officer; which also adds a paragraph
that is signed by the accused that they agree to
appear on the date and time stated and that is
the end of the story.
There are times when during a traffic stop
an officer finds that the driver for instance, is
driving while under the influence of either
alcohol or drugs; the officer sees a gun on the
seat of the car; the car smells of marihuana; the
officer sees packages of cocaine or some other
reason, like a check of the license number of
the person stopped shows that the person is a
fugitive or has another charge pending; in
which case the officer that made the stop seizes
the person and takes him or her to the police
station to await being taken before a Magistrate,
where the officer makes the complaint against
the person and the Magistrate then sets a bond
or refuses to allow one, whichever he chooses.
There is no evidence in our case that there
was any reason for Mrs. Atwater to be seized
and taken to the police station where she waited
for an hour for a Magistrate to release her.
The majority setting aside the panel opinion
makes no mention of an affidavit that is in the
Record Excerpts of appellants, Gail Atwater
and her husband, on behalf of two of their
children. The affidavit is that of Keith A.
Campbell, who was a member of the
Recruitment Unit of the Austin Police
Department from August 1994 to March 1997.
In the affidavit he makes mention of all the
things he did when screening applicants for
positions in the Austin Police Department. Mr.
Campbell states he has reviewed the personnel
file of Michael Barton Turek and he can state
without reservation that he would not have
recommended this individual to be hired by the
Austin Police Department for the following
reasons:
1. Lack of maturity based on his own
explanations of changes in employment in the
"reasons for leaving" sub-sections of each
employer's identification.
2. Failed two of three reported
psychological tests at A.P.D.
3. Failed to provide complete information.
Mr. Campbell's affidavit is an eye-opener of
the kind of person Officer Turek, who saw fit
to handcuff Mrs. Atwater behind her back for
not wearing her seatbelt, is. Mrs. Atwater and
her husband have sued the City of Lago Vista
for its unreasonable hiring and lack of training
of Turek.
Under Texas law, the City of Lago Vista is
not responsible for the actions of their police
officers unless they violate somebody's
Constitutional Rights. Our colleagues in the
majority seem to think that if an officer has
probable cause to make a stop and an arrest it
immunizes them to where they can do whatever
they please. This approach is wrong because in
my view, probable cause will never immunize a
constitutional violation.
Officer Turek had probable cause to stop
the car that was being driven by Mrs. Atwater
for failure to have her seatbelt on, but he
should have given her a citation to appear
instead of seizing her, putting handcuffs behind
her back, and taking her to the police station.
He would have taken her children with her
except that a neighbor that came on the scene
took the children to her home.
I strongly believe that my duty under the
oath that I have taken, once as a United States
District Judge, then as an Appellate Judge, is to
uphold the Constitution and Laws of the
United States. Under Article IV of the
Amendments to the Constitution, the seizure is
different then the stop and the arrest of Mrs.
Atwater was unreasonable and therefore a
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violation of the Constitution of the United
States. I cannot see why some of my colleagues
are unwilling to say that the seizure by Officer
Turek was unreasonable.
WIENER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Today a majority of this court announces
that any full custodial arrest, replete with
transportation to jail and booking, is per se a
reasonable seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment as long as the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe that the
individual being arrested has violated the law --
any law, even an innocuous traffic ordinance.
Not only does this holding ignore the Supreme
Court's longstanding pronouncements that
every Fourth Amendment analysis must turn
on a tripartite balancing of individual interests,
government interests, and the degree of
certainty that the government interest will be
furthered by the search or seizure at issue, but it
also turns a blind eye on the extreme facts of
this case; facts that so clearly demonstrate an
unreasonable seizure that those of my
colleagues who concur in the majority opinion
should have been tipped off that something
must be critically awry with its reasoning. The
result reached is so counterintuitive that it cries
out for a deeper look. As the Fourth
Amendment requires that every seizure must be
effected pursuant to a legitimate governmental
interest, and as the only conceivable reason for
the full custodial arrest at issue here was Officer
Turek's illegitimate desire to punish Atwater, I
respectfully dissent.
I
When, as here, the facts virtually speak for
themselves, it is disappointing -- even if not
surprising -- that the majority opinion goes out
of its way to sanitize them. The instant facts
reveal that this case is not truly about a traffic
stop followed by an arrest; it is about a police
officer going to extreme lengths to satisfy a
personal crusade or possibly even a vendetta.
The evidence would allow a jury reasonably to
infer that Officer Turek had been eagerly
awaiting the opportunity to threaten, frighten,
and humiliate Gail Atwater: Approximately two
months prior to the incident in question,
Officer Turek had pulled Atwater over for a
putative seatbelt violation; however, much to
his dismay, he had been forced to let her drive
off without his issuing her a citation when he
discovered that she and the other occupants of
her car had their seatbelts securely fastened.
Officer Turek's frustration over this prior
incident was made readily apparent from the
very beginning of the traffic stop and arrest that
are now under review. When Atwater was
pulled over this time, she was driving her two
children, ages six and four, home from soccer
practice. She was traveling in a residential
neighborhood, on bone-dry streets, in broad
daylight, and at a reasonable, lawful rate of
speed. When Officer Turek observed that
neither Atwater nor her children were wearing
seatbelts, he proceeded to pull her car over.
According to the testimony, Officer Turek
approached Atwater's car and yelled at her in a
belligerent and threatening manner, pointing his
finger menacingly in Atwater's face and
terrifying her and her young children. Officer
Turek screamed that they had "had this
conversation before" and that this time she
(Atwater) was going to jail.
Officer Turek then ordered Atwater to
produce her driver's license and proof of
insurance. Atwater informed him that both
documents had been in her purse when it was
stolen two days earlier. She did, though,
provided him with her license number and
address from her checkbook. Despite the fact
that Officer Turek had seen Atwater's driver's
license and proof of insurance when he had
pulled her over only weeks earlier, he
proceeded to make good on his promise to take
her to jail. First, he had her step out of her car;
next, he handcuffed her behind her back; then
he loaded her into the back of his squad car and
took her to the police station; and there she was
forced to remove her shoes and glasses, empty
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her pockets, and allow her "mug shot" to be
taken. Finally, Atwater was placed in a jail cell
and made to wait for approximately one hour
before being produced before a magistrate.
II
The law is long and well established that,
under the Fourth Amendment, the scope of a
search or seizure "must be strictly tied to and
justified by the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible." *** Implicit in this
simple but forceful statement of the law -- and
explicit in its application by the Supreme Court
to a broad panoply of cases -- is the precept
that the permissibility of any search or seizure
depends on a balancing of (1) the government's
purported interest in effecting the search or
seizure, (2) discounted by the degree of
certainty that the search or seizure will in fact
further the government's interest, against (3)
the extent of any infringement on the targeted
individual's constitutionally protected privacy
and liberty interests.'
6 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the
government's interest in protecting police
officers is sufficient to justify a limited "stop
and frisk" of an individual when supported by
reasonable suspicion that the individual is
carrying a weapon. *** But the same
governmental interest is insufficient to justify
the "wholly different kind of intrusion"
involved in an arrest absent a greater degree of
certainty -- namely, probable cause -- that the
seizure will vindicate the governmental interest
in question. ***
Similarly, although reasonable suspicion is
sufficient to justify a "stop and frisk" for the
purpose of protecting the police, the same
quantum of certainty is insufficient to justify a
"stop and frisk" for the less important and
more generalized governmental interest in
investigating and preventing crime. *** The
Supreme Court applied the same framework in
Tennessee v. Garner, *** when it held that the
government's interest in enforcing the criminal
laws is sufficient to justify an arrest that is
The problem I perceive with the majority
opinion is that its analysis focuses solely on the
quantum of certainty involved in the case, to
the exclusion of the other two relevant
variables: the importance of the government's
interest and the extent of the intrusion on the
individual's liberty and privacy interests. This is
all the more regrettable in light of the fact that
quantum of certainty is not even at issue here:
Atwater concedes that Officer Turek had
probable cause to believe that she had broken
the law by failing to wear a seatbelt. Indeed,
Atwater further acknowledges that the
government's interest in enforcing the traffic
laws was sufficient to justify Officer Turek's
decision, based on probable cause, to effect a
traffic stop, and that the same interest would
have justified his issuing her a citation. What
Atwater vehemently denies, though, is that the
government had any legitimate interest
whatsoever -- whether on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or even
absolute certainty -- in effecting her full
custodial arrest and transporting her to jail
when the issuing of a citation would have fully
protected and vindicated all of the
government's interests.
"The Fourth Amendment proceeds as
much by limitations upon the scope of
governmental action as by imposing
preconditions upon its initiation." *** The mere
fact that Officer Turek was justified in pulling
Atwater over, and would have been justified in
issuing her a citation, does not necessarily mean
that he was justified in taking the far more
intrusive step of effecting her full custodial
arrest, complete with behind-the-back
handcuffing, transporting to jail, and booking.
supported by probable cause to believe that a
suspect has committed a burglary, but that the
government cannot employ the more extreme
form of seizure involved in the use of deadly
force absent the more important governmental
interest of protecting the public from the threat
of serious bodily harm.
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"In justifying [a] particular intrusion [a] police
officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." *** In other words, to
justify each successive, increasingly stringent
intrusion on an individual's liberty and privacy
interests, a police officer must at a minimum be
able to articulate some reason why it was
necessary to effect the further intrusion. The
articulated reason does not need to be
independent of the reasons that justify the
initial intrusions: "The test is whether those
interests are sufficiently substantial, not
whether they are independent of the interest in
investigating crimes effectively and
apprehending suspects." *** But if the
identified reasons for both the initial and the
successive intrusions are the same, a police
officer must be able to advance a plausible
claim that the initial intrusions were inadequate
fully to serve the proffered governmental
interests. If the officer cannot plausibly make
that claim -- in other words, if there were no
legitimate reasons for the further intrusions -- then
the heightened intrusions are by definition
"unreasonable."
I agree with the majority that the courts
should avoid getting into the business of micro-
managing arrests. I do not agree, however, that
a jurisprudence that is faithful to the
fundamental principles of the Fourth
Amendment -- and that thus would find a
Fourth Amendment violation in the instant
case -- requires the courts to engage in such a
practice. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
when a police officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has violated or is
violating the law, there are good and obvious
reasons for that officer to arrest the individual.
Clearly, none of these or other similar
reasons are applicable to Officer Turek's arrest
of Atwater. She is a local resident, well-known
to Officer Turek. There is no indication that
she posed even a minimal flight risk. The
evidence amply demonstrates that she did not
pose any threat to the officer or the
community. And there was no need to conduct
any further investigation, as the full extent of
Atwater's violation of the seatbelt law had
already been clearly ascertained. By this process
of elimination, then, the one and only
conclusion that can be reached on the evidence
is that the sole reason Officer Turek arrested
Atwater was his determination to inflict
punishment on her, above and beyond the $
50.00 fine prescribed by Texas law. Not only is
the arresting officer's personal desire to punish
a constitutionally illegitimate reason under the
Fourth Amendment for effecting a seizure; it is
also, at least potentially, an independent
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which permit the infliction of
punishment only after a formal adjudication.
*** Allowing Officer Turek to skate here gives
the officer on the street carte blanche to be a
one-person cop cum judge cum jury cum
executioner: In effect, he can arrest, charge, try,
convict, and both assess and inflict punishment.
The desire of the majority of my esteemed
colleagues to arrive at a simple, bright-line rule
that can be easily applied by officers in the field
is both understandable and laudable.' But such
' The majority claims that its holding is
mandated by language found in Whren, *
("Where probable cause has existed, the only
cases in which we have found it necessary
actually to perform the 'balancing' analysis
involved searches or seizures conducted in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an
individual's privacy or even physical interests").
Not only is this language dicta, however -- the
Whren court was assessing the validity of a
traffic stop, not a full custodial arrest -- but it
arguably supports my position rather than the
majority's. "Extraordinary" is defined in
Webster's Dictionary as "going beyond what is
usual, regular, or customary." WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 296 (1965). Of course, what
qualifies as "usual, regular, or customary" is
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"a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the Amendment" ignores the
complexity of real-world events and thus fails
to remain faithful to the fundamental principles
underlying the Fourth Amendment. *** It also
has the unfortunate effect of licensing the
admittedly rare rogue patrol officer to inflict
vigilante punishment on a citizen under the
guise of an arrest -- a state of affairs that the
Constitution clearly does not tolerate.
The rule that I would apply to this case has
the virtue of being just as simple as the
majority's, and thus just as easy for the police to
apply in the myriad complex and confusing
situations that they regularly encounter,
without, however, jettisoning the fundamental
principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Simply stated: Before a police officer can
constitutionally place an individual under full
custodial arrest, even with probable cause, the
officer must have a plausible, articulable reason
for effecting such an intrusion -- a reason other
than a desire on the part of the officer to
punish the individual for his or her conduct.
This is hardly a burdensome imposition on the
police; I cannot see any reason for the police to
complain about having to articulate some
manner of justification for the significant
intrusion on Fourth Amendment privacy and
liberty interests inherent in effecting any full
custodial arrest.
Try as I may, I can discern no legitimate
justification whatsoever for Officer Turek's
lamentable decision to arrest, handcuff,
transport, book, and jail Atwater; conversely, I
see every indication that Officer Turek's sole
entirely dependent on the circumstances; an
action that would be deemed an extraordinary
response to one set of facts might be thought
quite ordinary and commonplace if the facts
were different. It need hardly be said that a full
custodial arrest, complete with behind-the-
back-handcuffing, transporting to jail, and
booking, is an extraordinary response to a local
mother's daytime seatbelt violation.
purpose in doing so was unilaterally to inflict an
illegitimate -- and unconstitutional --
punishment on her. For these reasons, I must
respectfully dissent.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion does not address an
important constitutional issue raised by this
case, discussed extensively at oral argument,
and fully considered by the en banc court:
whether the Fourth Amendment, by
incorporating the common law at the time it
was framed, prohibits, as an unreasonable
seizure, the warrantless full custodial arrest of
an individual for a fine-only criminal
misdemeanor that does not constitute or
involve a breach of the peace.
The district court's granting of the
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions
is reviewed de novo by this court of appeals. ***
In accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 3 and 28,
the appellant adequately noticed and argued to
this court the issue of whether the warrantless
full custodial arrest of a person for violation of
a fine-only criminal misdemeanor seat-belt law,
involving no breach of the peace, violates that
person's Fourth Amendment rights.
The foregoing question of law is the only
issue presented by this appeal. The district
court concluded that the plaintiffs "have not
provided evidence of any violation of a
constitutional right, much less a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right." The
district court based its ruling primarily on the
specific finding that the "only alleged 'force'
and 'imprisonment' arose out [ofl Turek's arrest
of Atwater for the seat belt violations as clearly
authorized by Texas law."
For purposes of the motion for summary
judgment, the district court found that Turek,
immediately upon stopping Atwater, yelled at
her, "We've met before!" and "You're going to
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jail!" Based upon these findings and the
evidence, it reasonably can be inferred that
Turek initially placed Atwater in full custodial
arrest based only on the seat belt violations and
called for a back up to assist him in his seizure
of Atwater, her children, and her vehicle.
Consequently, this appeal does not raise the
question of whether Turek constitutionally
could have made a full custody arrest of
Atwater for the additional charges he sometime
later filed against her of failure to provide proof
of insurance and failure to have her driver's
license in her possession. Moreover, the failure
to provide evidence of insurance or financial
responsibility in itself is not a crime or offense
under Texas law. *** The failure to carry or
exhibit a driver's license is a fine-only, non-
peace breaching misdemeanor, if, as in this
case, it is not a third or subsequent conviction
within one year after the date of the second
such conviction. *** Finally, because Turek
recently before had stopped Atwater and had
examined her driver's license and evidence of
insurance, there is a genuine factual dispute, not
amenable to summary judgment, as to whether
Turek had probable cause to file the additional
charges against Atwater, which were summarily
dismissed the same day by the magistrate.
I cannot join the majority opinion because
it does not acknowledge or address the
arguments in favor of the proposition that an
unnecessary full custodial arrest of a person for
a fine-only criminal misdemeanor involving no
breach of the peace is an unreasonable seizure
against which the people have been guaranteed
a right to be secure in their persons by the
Fourth Amendment. Those arguments were set
forth fully and very persuasively by the briefs of
the petitioner and his amici in *** Ricd v.
Arlington Heghts, 116 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 679, 139 L Ed 2d 627,
and cert. dismissed, 523 U.S. 613, 118 S. Ct. 1693,
140 L Ed. 2d 789 (1998) (No. 97-501). In
summary, I read the arguments to be as follows:
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the
right of the people to be secure in their
persons... against unreasonable... seizures, shall
not be violated[.]" When determining whether a
particular governmental action violates the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
said that the first inquiry is whether the action
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
under the common law when the amendment
was framed. *** "Where that inquiry yields no
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness
by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate
interests." ***
The common law prohibited the
warrantless arrest of an individual for a
misdemeanor unless it involved a breach of the
peace. As the Supreme Court in Carmll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L
Ed. 543 (1925) stated:
'In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer
like a private person has at common law no
power of arresting without a warrant except
when a breach of the peace has been
committed in his presence or there is
reasonable ground for supposing that a
breach of peace is about to be committed
or renewed in his presence.' Halsbury's
Laws of England, vol. 9, part. III, 612.
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors
without warrant at common law was
promptly to suppress breaches of the peace
(1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 193),
while the reason for arrest without warrant
on a reliable report of a felony was because
the public safety and the due apprehension
of criminals charged with heinous offenses
required that such arrests should be made at
once without warrant (Rohan v. Sawin, 5
Cush. [Mass.] 28 1).
While the term "peace of the king" at
common law meant, in one sense, the "law
and sovereignty" of the king in general,
with regard to a peace officer's power of
arrest the term denoted "some violent or
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disorderly act causing public alarm or
disturbance...." *** The misdemeanors for
which common law allowed custodial arrest
were serious offenses, including assaults
and other dangerous and disruptive acts, or
public disturbances. ***
Applied to the case at hand, it seems
evident that the failure to buckle a seat-belt
hardly conjures up images of the "violent or
disorderly acts" contemplated by the common
law as warranting a full custodial arrest. ***
Gail Atwater's infraction of the Texas fine-only
criminal misdemeanor seat-belt law did not
constitute or portend any disturbance that
would even approach a breach of the peace
under the common law when the Fourth
Amendment was framed. Therefore, the initial
inquiry required by the Supreme Court's
decisions yields the answer that Turek's full
custodial arrest of Atwater for that infraction
violated her right under the Fourth
Amendment to be secure in her person against
unreasonable seizures.
Even if the historical evidence were
thought to be equivocal *** the panel opinion
in this case demonstrates that the balancing of
the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor
of protecting the personal privacy and personal
dignity of an individual from an intrusion that
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and
humiliating experience. *** In this case in
which there is substantial and perhaps
conclusive evidence that the governmental
action would have been regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when
the amendment was framed, the panel opinion
also is very persuasive in its evaluation of the
seizure under the traditional standards of
reasonableness and its conclusion that the
degree to which the seizure intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and dignity undoubtedly
outweighs the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.
The majority opinion affirms the district
court's summary judgment without undertaking
the first or the second inquiry demanded of us
by the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme
Court's decisions in Wyoming v. Houghton *** and
Cakfornia . Hodari D. *** The Supreme Court's
reaffirmation of our duty to make these
inquiries subsequent to its decision in Whren v.
United States*** and the Supreme Court's recent
willingness to examine the issue of warrantless
custodial arrests for peace-breachless fine-only
misdemeanors in Ricci v. Arlington Heights *
convinces me that the majority is mistaken in
assuming that our obligation to carefully
scrutinize intrusions upon the right of the
people to be secure in their persons has been
totally displaced by a simple Whren probable
cause matrix. Accordingly, because the majority
used an inappropriate truncated analysis to
reach what appears to be an incorrect result, I
respectfully dissent.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SEAT BELT CASE; LAGO VISTA WOMAN
Austin American-Statesman
Tuesday, June 27, 2000
Andrea Ball
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
-hear a Lago Vista case that could decide
whether police officers can arrest drivers for
minor traffic offenses.
Lago Vista resident Gail Atwater sued the
City of Lago Vista in 1997 after she was
arrested because she and her two children were
not wearing seat belts.
Atwater claimed the arrest -- for an offense
punishable only by a fine -- violated Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure. After winning and losing
rounds in the federal court system, her case is
expected to be argued before the Supreme
Court in December.
The court's intervention could have wide-
ranging consequences, said Robert DeCarli,
Atwater's lawyer.
"Their decision will impact the roughly 160
million Americans who have driver's licenses,"
DeCarli said. "This will determine whether you
can or can't arrest someone for a traffic
violation."
Lawyer Bill Krueger said the city stands
behind its actions.
"Miss Atwater's treatment is reasonable and
constitutional, and that has been the court's
ruling to date," he said. "We look forward to
arguing this case before the United States
Supreme Court."
In March 1997, Atwater and her two
children were going home from soccer practice
when her son's toy fell from the truck,
according to her Supreme Court petition.
Atwater turned the vehicle around, removed
her seat belt and slowly drove down a
residential street to look for the toy, she said.
Her son, Mac, then 4, and daughter, Anya, then
6, also unfastened their seat belts, Atwater said.
Former Lago Vista officer Bart Turek
stopped the vehicle and, Atwater said, began
shouting at her about the seat belt violation.
"My kids were immediately terrified," she
said Monday. "I said calmly and quietly, 'Please
don't yell.' He pointed his finger in my face and
said, 'You're going to jail.'"
A neighbor at the scene took the children
while Atwater was handcuffed and taken to the
police station. She was charged with several seat
belt violations, driving without a license and
failing to provide proof of insurance.
Her truck was searched and impounded.
The license and proof of insurance charges
were later dropped, and Atwater pleaded no
contest to the seat belt violations.
The maximum penalty for a seat belt
violation is a $50 fine. Under Texas law, an
officer is allowed -- but not required -- to arrest
someone for a seat belt offense.
Lago Vista Mayor Dennis Jones declined to
comment on the case. An insurance policy with
the Texas Municipal League has covered most
of the city's legal expenses in the case, minus a
$5,000 deductible.
Atwater's 1997 lawsuit came at a
tumultuous time for the Lago Vista Police
Department. That summer, the department was
hit with five lawsuits alleging that officers had
crossed the line into wrongful arrests, excessive
force and other abuses of power.
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The city won and disposed of the other
four lawsuits, Krueger said. But Atwater's case
has bounced from court to court, earning
different decisions along the way.
She lost the first round in Austin federal
court in 1998, when U.S. District Judge Sam
Sparks pronounced the arrest constitutional.
Then a three-judge panel at the 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in New Orleans reversed that
decision in January 1999. Two months later, a
panel of 17 judges reheard the case in New
Orleans, voting against Atwater 11-6.
The Texas affiliate of the American Civil
Liberties Union has sided with Atwater and
wrote a brief urging the Supreme Court to hear
the case. Will Harrell, executive director of the
ACLU in Austin, said the court must impose
limits on the power of law enforcement.
"Even though the Texas law allows for an
arrest, it's not that simple," Harrell said. "The
court always looks at the interest of the
individual against the interest of the state.
Imagine if, in everyday circumstances, people
were arrested for a minor traffic offense. You
can't do it. It's unreasonable, unworkable."
But Krueger says the law is on the city's
side.
"Miss Atwater doesn't contest the
constitutionality of the Texas statute," he said.
"She is arguing that her circumstance is
extraordinary, and it's not."
Copyright C) 2000 The Austin American
Statesman
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BUCKLING IN
Woman Drives Seat Belt Case to Supreme Court
The Dallas Morning News
Monday, July 3,2000
Terrence Stutz
LAGO VISTA, Texas - Gail Atwater has
vivid memories of the day she was handcuffed
by police in front of her two young children
and hauled off to jail.
Like other accused lawbreakers, she was
booked, photographed and led to a holding cell,
and her pickup was searched and impounded.
Her crime: not wearing a seat belt.
For Ms. Atwater, the minor traffic
violation - subject to a $ 50 fine - was far out of
proportion with her treatment by police.
"This is scary to the average citizen
because they don't want to believe it could ever
happen to them," she said. "It should not
happen in our country, but it did to me."
Her complaint, first raised to city officials
in this Hill Country community three years ago,
reached the nation's highest court last week.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case, in which Ms. Atwater argues that the city
of Lago Vista violated her Fourth Amendment
rights under the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth
Amendment protects citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
City officials contend the arrest was
proper, noting that Texas law allows an officer
to make an arrest for violation of the state's
mandatory seat belt law.
"The officer was within his authority when
he arrested her, and he had in fact stopped her
for seat belt issues once before," said Austin
lawyer Bill Krueger, who represents Lago Vista
and the officer who made the arrest.
"The law is there to protect persons not
wearing their seat belts," he said, noting that
Ms. Atwater's two children also were not
wearing seat belts when the arrest was made in
March 1997.
On that day, Ms. Atwater and her two
children - Anya, then 6, and Mac, then 4 - were
driving back from soccer practice and were
about two blocks from home when Mac said a
toy bat attached to a window of the truck had
fallen off. Ms. Atwater turned her truck around
and drove slowly back up the street looking for
the toy.
While they were searching, she said, she
and her children unfastened their seat belts so
they could get a better view of the street.
They were subsequently stopped by a Lago
Vista police officer who, according to Ms.
Atwater, shouted at her about the unfastened
seat belts.
"I asked him politely not to yell because
my kids were scared," she said. "He then told
me I was going to jail." A neighbor took her
children when she was handcuffed and taken to
the police station, where she was charged and
kept in a cell for about an hour.
After later pleading no contest to the seat
belt charges - two other charges for driving
without a license and proof of insurance were
dropped - Ms. Atwater talked with city officials
for months about changing their policy on
minor traffic violations. When they declined to
take action, she filed suit in federal court in
Austin.
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A federal judge granted a summary
judgment in favor of the city, and Ms. Atwater
appealed to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in New Orleans, which overturned the
judge and ruled in her favor. The city asked for
all 17 appellate judges in the 5th Circuit to hear
the case again, and they ruled 11-6 for the city.
Robert DeCarli, Ms. Atwater's attorney,
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which agreed last week to consider the case.
"We hear about Miranda and other federal
cases, but this case could be far more important
because it directly impacts all of us, some 185
million drivers in the U.S.," Mr. DeCarli said.
"Everyone who ever receives a traffic
citation could be affected. If the city's position
is accepted by the courts, anyone whoever
receives a ticket - no matter how small the
infraction - could be handcuffed and hauled off
to jail."
Mr. DeCarli said his client's case rests on
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that all
searches and seizures be reasonable.
"When a person is handcuffed and taken to
jail for an offense where the penalty is only a $
50 fine, that is about as unreasonable as you can
get," he said.
The Austin lawyer added that he believes
that most law enforcement officers "would not
think of doing something like this."
But Mr. Krueger said it is indisputable that
Texas statute allows for the arrest of anyone
not wearing a seat belt while driving.
"We say there is no case law that would
hold Ms. Atwater's circumstances special," he
said. "An officer may make an arrest in this
type of situation. We believe the officer acted
reasonably and within the Constitution - and a
solid majority of justices in the 5th Circuit
agreed."
The appeal is expected to be heard by the
Supreme Court in early December. If Ms.
Atwater wins, the case will be returned to
federal court in Austin for trial.
"We just want our day in court," she said,
voicing her displeasure with the way she has
been portrayed by city officials. They tried to
get her to write an apology to the police officer.
"The city has tried to make people believe
I did something to incite the officer's behavior.
That is absolutely false. Anyone who knows me
knows I am like June Cleaver [on Leave it to
Beaver]. I have been on the PTA board, the
library board, and I have been the mom people
call when they are in a jam," she said.
Ms. Atwater and her husband, who have
educated themselves on the law during their
three-year battle with the city, are confident as
they head toward their showdown before the
highest court in the nation.
"Even though it started out as a small
incident, it has become a huge constitutional
issue that could affect many Americans," she
said. "I have to say I never dreamed it would
come this far. But we are ready."
Copyright C) 2000 The Dallas Morning News
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FROM UNBUCKLED TO HANDCUFFED IN NO TIME
The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC)
Monday, April 17, 2000
James Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
WASHINGTON -- Now pending in the
Supreme Court on a petition for review is the
case of Atwater vs. Turek. It is an ugly piece of
business. U.S. Circuit Judge Robert M. Parker
tells the story:
"Gail Atwater and her family are long-term
residents of Lago Vista, Texas, a suburb of
Austin. She is a full-time mother and her
husband is an emergency room physician at a
local hospital. On the pleasant spring afternoon
of March 26, 1997, as Gail Atwater was driving
her children home after their soccer practice at
15 miles per hour through her residential
neighborhood, she violated Section 545.413 of
the Texas Transportation Code. Neither Gail
Atwater, her 4-year-old son nor her 6-year-old
daughter were wearing their seat belts.
"Detecting this breach of the peace and
dignity of the state, Lago Vista police officer
Bart Turek set about to protect the community
from the perpetration of such a crime ... It was
not a proud moment for the City of Lago Vista.
"Officer Turek approached the driver's side
window and aggressively jabbed his finger
toward her face. Turek screamed either that
they had met before or had this conversation
before. Turek's conduct frightened her children,
so Atwater calmly and in a normal tone
requested Turek to lower his voice.
"According to Atwater, the request further
triggered his wrath. Turek responded
immediately by telling Atwater that she was
going to jail. Atwater remained calm. Atwater
was not acting suspiciously, she did not pose
any threat to Turek, and she was not engaged in
any illegal conduct other than failing to wear a
seat belt.
"After telling Atwater that she would be
taken to jail, Turek demanded her driver's
license and proof of insurance. When Atwater
informed Turek that her license and insurance
card were in her purse that had been stolen a
couple of days before, Turek ridiculed her and
implied that she was a liar . .. Atwater then
asked Turek to allow her to take her children to
a friend's house before taking her to jail, but he
refused her request. Turek stated that her
children could accompany her to the police
station. Fortunately, a friend of Atwater's who
came to the scene took the children into her
care.
"Although under Texas law Turek could
have issued Atwater a traffic citation if she
signed a promise to appear, he instead chose to
handcuff Atwater with her hands behind her
back, load her into his squad car and take her to
the police station. Once at the station, Atwater
was required to remove her shoes and glasses,
empty her pockets and have her picture taken.
She was then placed in a jail cell before being
taken to a magistrate."
Judge Parker wrote for a three-judge panel
in January of last year. He and his concurring
colleagues held that Turek's actions were
"indefensible." In November the entire 5th
Circuit considered the case and by a vote of 10-
6 reversed the panel's judgment. Writing for the
majority, Judge Emilio M. Garza held that there
was nothing "extraordinary" or "unusually
harmful" in Turek's conduct. From that
judgment Atwater has appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Her petition is set for conference April 21.
At stake is a question of constitutional law that
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the high court has sidetracked at least twice.
Does the custodial arrest of a motorist for a
minor traffic offense violate his rights under the
Fourth and 14th Amendments?
In 1973 the court heard argument on
essentially the same issue, but the case went off
on a different point involving more search than
seizure. Again in 1998 the court heard the
question debated, but dismissed the case
without opinion.
Counsel for Atwater make a persuasive
argument in support of Supreme Court review.
Roughly 190 million Americans hold driver's
licenses. "At some point in their driving careers,
virtually every one of them will violate SOME
traffic law." I will confess my own sins: I have
twice been arrested for speeding, once in a
South Carolina speed trap, and again in Virginia
when I got swept away by Rachmaninoff on the
car radio. No one put handcuffs on me. In each
instance I mailed in a check and that was that.
The Fourth Amendment does not protect a
motorist from every form of custodial arrest,
but it surely protects us from "unreasonable"
seizures. If the cop's treatment of Gail Atwater
was not constitutionally unreasonable,
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment
has gone badly awry.
Copyright ( 2000 The News and Observer
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TEXAS v. COBB
May a Represented-by-Counsel Defendant Later Waive His Sixth Arnendment Right to
Counsel?
Meredith Lugo*
Everyone who has ever watched a police show on television by now knows that not only does a
criminal suspect have the right to remain silent, he or she also has the right to an attorney. What is not
so clear, however, are the parameters of the representation that is guaranteed. When it hears Texas v.
Cobb this term the Supreme Court will attempt to further delineate these parameters.
Cobb involves a burglary and double murder. On December 27, 1993 Lindsey Owings notified
police that his home had been burglarized and that his wife and baby daughter were missing. In early
February, 1994 police received an anonymous tip that Raymond Cobb might have been involved in the
burglary of the Owings' home. Cobb was questioned by police and denied the allegations, but later
confessed to the burglary on July 15, 1994. However, he continued to deny any involvement in the
disappearances. Attorney Hal Ridley was appointed to represent Cobb following his arraignment.
Investigators requested Ridley's permission to question Cobb regarding the disappearances soon after
the arraignment and then again in September, 1995, which Ridley granted after receiving assurances that
Cobb was not a suspect in those disappearances. On November 11, 1995 Cobb's father called the
Walker County police and told them that his son had just confessed to killing Margaret Owings and
burying her body in the woods behind her home. The Walker County police notified the Odessa police,
for Cobb was at that time residing in Odessa, and faxed them a warrant for Cobb's arrest, but failed to
inform them that Cobb was represented by counsel in the burglary case. Cobb was arrested and
interrogated by the Odessa police, and subsequently confessed in a written statement to killing both
Margaret Owings and her daughter. Having been convicted of the killings and sentenced to death,
Cobb is challenging the admissibility of his written statement. He argues the statement was obtained in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the Odessa police initiated the interrogation
without notifying Ridley, his counsel of record.
An en banc majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas agreed. Judge Mansfield,
writing for the majority, reviewed relevant Supreme Court precedent, and easily concluded that the
interrogation violated Cobb's Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has stated that the right to
counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial proceedings, and once attached cannot be unilaterally
waived by the accused during police-initiated interrogation. Counsel must first grant the police
permission to interrogate their client (Michigan v. Jackson, United States Supreme Court, 1986). Further,
once the right to counsel attaches, it attaches not just to the offense charged but also to any other
offense closely factually related (State v. Frye, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1995). In addition,
state actors are assumed to work in concert, and therefore knowledge may be imputed amongst them
(Jackson). Taken together, the majority held, these principles require that Cobb's case be remanded for a
new trial. The capital murder offense was factually interwoven with the burglary, thus requiring the
police to get permission from Ridley to question Cobb. They failed to do so, the majority held, and thus
the statement was inadmissible. The court granted Cobb a new trial because of the reasonable
likelihood that the admission of the statement materially affected the jury's deliberations.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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The dissenting judges held that there was no constitutional violation, and that therefore Cobb's
statement was admissible. Judge McCormick disagreed with the majority's decision that Ridley's prior
grant of permission to the police to speak to Cobb was irrelevant, and held that Ridley had granted the
police "unqualified," ongoing permission to question his client. More importantly, Judge McCormick
contended that defendants are allowed to unilaterally waive their tight to counsel, even after such right
has attached and counsel has been appointed, and supported this assertion with United States Supreme
Court precedent. He argued that the majority wrongly relied upon Jackson, disregarding the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Brewer v. Williams (1977), which Judge McCormick interpreted to give clients
the ability to unilaterally waive their right to counsel. However, the Court in Brewer did not directly
confront this issue, and the holding in Jackson seems clearly on point: "written waivers ... are
insufficient to justify to police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth
Amendment analysis." If written waivers are insufficient, so must be verbal waivers. It should be noted,
however, that two members of the current Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, dissented from the Court's decision in Jackson.
The dissent argues Cobb is a question of whether defendants may be allowed to speak for
themselves free from the muzzle of their attorneys. The majority, on the other hand, sees the case as a
clear example of the need to protect defendants from constitutional violations by overzealous police
officers. It is unclear how the Supreme Court will resolve the issue, but the Court's decision will likely
be a reconsideration of its 1986 decision in Jackson.
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99-1702 Texas v. Cobb
Ruling below (Tex. Crim. App., 3/15/00):
Once defendant was indicted for burglary, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to that
offense and to related charges of capital murder, and, therefore, before police could lawfully question
defendant about whereabouts of missing residents of burglarized home, they were obliged to contact
his counsel for permission; defendant's waiver of rights during police-initiated interrogation that
commenced after his right to counsel had attached and been invoked by his acceptance of appointment
of counsel was invalid, under Michzgan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), absent counsel's permission for
interrogation; counsel's permission to interview defendant on prior occasions before he became suspect
in disappearances is not relevant to questioning at issue, and, therefore fruits of interrogation about
murders was inadmissible in prosecution's case-in-chief.
Questions presented: (1) May accused make effective unilateral waiver of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel under Michigan v. Jackson and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), when his only previous
"assertion" of right to counsel consisted of accepting appointment of counsel following indictment on
different, but related, crime nearly one and one-half years earlier? (2) When accused has been indicted
for burglary, does his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach, under Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159
(1985), and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), to questioning about factually related murder in
case in which eventual capital murder conviction is not based on previously charged burglary as
predicate felony?
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Raymond Levi COBB, Appellant
V.
The State of TEXAS
Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas
Decided March 15, 2000
MANSFIELD, J.:
Appellant, Raymond Levi Cobb, was found
guilty of intentionally killing two people in a
single criminal transaction. See Tex. Pen. Code
§ 19.03. His punishment was assessed at death.
In eleven points of error, he argues that he is
entitled to a new trial or at least a reformation
of his sentence from death to imprisonment for
life. We will reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the cause for a new trial.
We turn next to appellant's fourth point of
error, in which he contends that the trial court
erred in admitting in evidence, at the
guilt/innocence stage, a written statement he
gave to police shortly after his arrest. Appellant,
citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986), and Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548
(Tex.Crim.App. 1993), argues that the police
obtained the statement in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because the police
initiated interrogation of him without first
notifying his counsel of record. The State
argues in response that, at the time the police
interrogated appellant, his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had not yet attached. The State
argues in the alternative that even if the right
had attached, the right had been waived
because on two previous occasions defense
counsel had allowed police to interrogate
appellant without counsel being present.
The facts relevant to this point of error are
as follows: On December 27, 1993, Lindsey
Owings notified the Walker County Sheriffs
Office that his home had been burglarized and
that some of his property had been stolen. He
also reported that his wife, Margaret, and his
daughter, Kori Rae, were missing.
Sometime in early February 1994, the
sheriffs office received an anonymous tip that
appellant, who resided across the street from
the Owings residence, might have been
involved in the burglary. Walker County
investigators questioned appellant about the
burglary and the disappearances, but he denied
any involvement. On July 15, 1994, after
further questioning by investigators, appellant,
who was then under arrest in an unrelated case,
gave a written statement in which he confessed
to the burglary. He continued to insist,
however, that he knew nothing about the
disappearances. A Walker County grand jury
subsequently indicted appellant for the
burglary.
On August 15, 1994, attorney Hal Ridley
was appointed to represent appellant in the
burglary case. Shortly thereafter, Walker County
investigators sought Ridley's permission to
question appellant again about the
disappearances. Ridley gave his permission, but
only after being assured that appellant was not a
suspect in the disappearances. The investigators
then questioned appellant, and he again denied
any involvement.
On September 13, 1995, Walker County
investigators again sought Ridley's permission
to question appellant about the disappearances,
and again he gave permission, still believing that
appellant was not a suspect. During the
questioning, appellant again denied any
involvement.
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On November 11, 1995, appellant's father,
Charles Cobb, who resided in Odessa,
telephoned the Walker County Sheriffs Office
with information regarding appellant, who was
then free on bond in the still-pending burglary
case and also residing in Odessa. Mr. Cobb
reported that appellant had just confessed to
him that he had killed Margaret Owings while
in the course of burglarizing her home and that
he had buried her body in a wooded area not
far from the home. Walker County
investigators instructed Mr. Cobb to proceed to
an Odessa police station to give a statement,
which he did. The Odessa police faxed Mr.
Cobb's statement to Walker County, and
investigators there used the statement to obtain
an arrest warrant, which they faxed back to
Odessa. The Walker County investigators
neglected, however, to inform the Odessa
police that appellant had counsel in the burglary
case. The Odessa police then located appellant,
arrested him, Mirandized *** him, and
interrogated him. After ninety minutes of
questioning, appellant gave a written statement
in which he admitted killing both Margaret and
Kori Rae Owings while in the course of
burglarizing their home.
Having explicated the relevant facts, we
turn now to the relevant law, which is both
settled and familiar. The Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States provides
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." This right to counsel
was made applicable to state felony
prosecutions by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. *** The purpose of
the right to counsel is to protect the unaided
layman after the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified with
respect to a particular alleged crime. *** The
right thus attaches at the initiation of
adversarial proceedings, whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment, and no request for
counsel need be made by the accused. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 *** (1977). Once the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches,
government efforts to elicit information from
the accused, including interrogation, represent
"critical stages" at which the right to counsel
applies. Michigan v. Jackson *** Therefore, for
the fruits of post-indictment interrogations to
be admissible in a prosecution's case-in-chief,
the State must prove a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
However, once the right to counsel has
attached and has been invoked, any subsequent
waiver during police-initiated interrogation is
ineffective unless counsel has first given
permission for the interrogation. Michigan v.
Jackson ***.
Also relevant to this case is the Sixth
Amendment rule that once the right to counsel
attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches
to any other offense that is very closely related
factually to the offense charged. *** This rule
prevents the government from circumventing
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel merely
"by charging a defendant with additional crimes
after questioning him without counsel present,"
*** or "by charging predicate crimes with the
purpose of questioning a suspect on an
aggravated crime," *
Relevant to this case, too, is the "Sixth
Amendment ... requirement that we impute the
State's knowledge from one state actor to
another." Michigan v. Jackson *** "One set of
state actors (the police) may not claim
ignorance of defendants' unequivocal request
for counsel to another state actor (the court)."
Ibid.
We now apply these rules of law to the case
at bar. Once appellant was indicted for the
Owings burglary, his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached to that offense and to the
capital murder offense, which was factually
interwoven with the burglary. It is also true that
once appellant's right to counsel attached, he
asserted it by accepting Ridley's appointment as
his counsel. Therefore, before the Odessa
police could lawfully question appellant about
the disappearances of the Owings, they were
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under an obligation to contact Ridley and get
his permission. They failed to do that.
Consequently, the fruits of the Odessa police
interrogation, including appellant's written
statement, were inadmissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.
The fact that Ridley twice gave permission
to Walker County investigators to question
appellant is irrelevant. Nothing in the record
suggests that Ridley's permission was intended
to be continuing or could have reasonably been
so interpreted.
Having found constitutional error, we still
need not reverse appellant's conviction if we
determine that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. *** If there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error materially affected the
jury's deliberations, then the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ***
The record reflects that appellant's
statement was incrininating and central to the
prosecution's case against him. Therefore, a
reasonable likelihood exists that the admission
of the statement in evidence materially affected
the jury's deliberations.
We sustain appellant's fourth point of error.
In view of our disposition of appellant's fourth
point of error, we need not address his
remaining points of error. The judgment of the
trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
McCORMICK, P.J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Neither the facts nor
the law support the Court's decision to
suppress appellant's voluntary confession.
More important is that even under the
Court's version of the facts, the law is not as
"settled and familiar" as the Court's opinion
would have it. Various United States Supreme
Court precedents can be read to support two
contrary holdings in this case. I would either
apply the body of law that balances the
competing interests in favor of admitting
appellant's voluntary confession *** or,
assuming the other body of law requires
suppression of appellant's voluntary confession,
I would decline to follow it.
II. EVEN UNDER THE COURT'S
VERSION OF THE FACTS, APPELLANT'S
VOLUNTARY CONFESSION IS STILL
ADMISSIBLE
The Court decides: (1) the police violated a
prophylactic rule meant to safeguard the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when the police
initiated questioning of appellant after he had
"asserted" his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel during arraignment on the burglary
charge some 17 months before appellant
confessed, and (2) suppression of appellant's
voluntary and reliable confession is the
appropriate remedy as a means to deter the
kind of "egregious police misconduct" that the
Court implicitly decides occurred in this case. I
would decide that the police did not violate any
prophylactic rule meant to safeguard the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and that appellant
made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel before he voluntarily
confessed.
For reasons more fully set out in this
opinion, the federal constitutional issue actually
presented is: can a represented-by-counsel
defendant whose Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has attached to an offense unilaterally
make a valid waiver of this Sixth Amendment
right to counsel upon police-initiated
interrogation about this offense? Some United
States Supreme Court precedent supports
holding that such a defendant can unilaterally
make a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel even when that defendant
previously has asserted his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. ***
In Brewer v. Williams, the United States
Supreme Court in a lead opinion authored by
Justice Stewart and joined by Justice Brennan
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decided that a defendant in a case like this did
not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 ***
(1977). The Court, however, decided that such
a defendant could unilaterally make a valid
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
even when the defendant previously has
asserted his right to counsel, otherwise it would
have been unnecessary for Brewer to decide
whether the defendant validly waived his right
to counsel:
"Despite Williams' express and inplicit
assertions of his right to counsel, Detective
Leaming proceeded to elicit incriminating
statements from Williams. Leaming did not
preface this effort by telling Williams that he
had a right to the presence of a lawyer, and
made no effort at all to ascertain whether
Williams wished to relinquish that right. The
circumstances of record in this case thus
provide no reasonable basis for finding that
Williams waived his right to the assistance of
counsel.
"The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do
we, that under the circumstances of this case
[the defendant] could not, without notice to
counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. *** It only held,
as we do, that he did not." ***
Several Justices filed separate concurring
and dissenting opinions in Brewer. ***
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting
opinion. *** His dissenting opinion, consistent
with Justice Stewart's lead opinion, recognized
"that a valid waiver was possible in these
circumstances, but was not quite made." *
Justice White also filed a dissenting opinion
which was joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Blackmun. *** His dissenting opinion,
consistent with Justice Stewart's lead opinion,
also recognized that Justice Stewart's lead
opinion created "no new rule preventing an
accused who has retained a lawyer from
waiving his right to the lawyer's presence during
questioning." ***
So, as things stood in 1977 when Brewer was
decided, at least six United States Supreme
Court Justices, a majority, shared the view that
a defendant could unilaterally make a valid
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
even when the defendant previously has
asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
*** And, as late as 1985 other United States
Supreme Court precedent was consistent with
Brewer in Sixth Amendment cases *** despite
the soon to be discussed United States Supreme
Court adoption of various prophylactic rules in
the Fifth Amendment context.
This brings us to the "relevant law" which
the Court's opinion claims is "settled and
familiar." The Court's opinion relies on Michigan
v. Jackson which in 1986 applied the just
mentioned Fifth Amendment Miranda v.
Arfiona/Edwards v. AriZona prophylactic rules to
the Sixth Amendment context. *** Jackson held
that "if police initiate interrogation after a
defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or
similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any
[unilateral] waiver of the defendant's right to
counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is
invalid." ***
But, Jackson, instead of overruling or
disapproving Brewer, actually relied on Brewer.
*** This is curious since Brewer is flatly
inconsistent with and contrary to Jackson's
holding. *** This creates a conflict between
Brewer and Jackson either of which the Court
may choose to apply.
And, having chosen to apply Jackson, the
Court's opinion fails to appreciate that this case
is distinguishable from Jackson in three
important respects. In Jackson the police
initiated interrogation of the defendants shortly
after their "request" for counsel at arraignment.
*** In this case, however, the police initiated
interrogation some 17 months after appellant's
arraignment. ***
Another distinction between this case and
Jackson is that appellant did not unequivocally
assert his right to counsel at any time before the
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police-initiated interrogation. The evidence is to
the contrary. ***
The other distinction between this case and
Jackson is that after any assertion of appellant's
right to counsel at arraignment the police twice
received permission from appellant's lawyer to
question appellant and the police questioned
appellant on "numerous occasions" over a 17
month period without any objections from
appellant or his lawyer. These actions by
appellant and his lawyer amount to a type of
waiver of any previous assertion of the right to
counsel some 17 months before appellant
confessed. Under these circumstances, it defies
common sense to decide that a 17-month-old
assertion of the right to counsel would still be
effective. Jackson, therefore, is neither "relevant"
nor controlling.
It now becomes necessary to address this
Court's federal constitutional decisions in
Holloway v. State, *** Upton v. State, *** and Fge
v. State. *** Holloway clearly decided, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, that a represented-
by-counsel defendant cannot unilaterally make
a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel during police-initiated interrogation on
offenses to which the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel has attached. *** Under Holloway, it
makes no difference whether this defendant
previously has asserted his right to counsel. ***
Holloway relied on various United States
Supreme Court decisions none of which clearly
support its holding. More important, Holloway
did not address Brewer. *** Holloway noted that
in Patterson v. Illinois, *** which came after
Jackson, the Supreme Court decided that an
unrepresented-by-counsel defendant who had
not previously asserted his right to counsel
could unilaterally make a valid waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ***
Holloway's contrary holding for a
represented-by-counsel defendant was based in
part on footnote three of Patterson which says "a
distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at
preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship takes effect" where an accused's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached
and he is represented by counsel. *** The
Supreme Court has yet to decide what these
"distinct set of constitutional safeguards" are.
Upton and Fye relied mainly on Holloway
and the authorities upon which Holloway relied.
Upton also noted a possible conflict between
Holloway and Brewer. *** For these reasons, I
would decline to follow Holloway, Upton and
Fge.
With this in mind, it is clear that Brewer and
Jackson conflict on whether a represented-by-
counsel defendant can unilaterally make a valid
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when that defendant previously has asserted his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Brewer says
he can. Jackson says he cannot. Patterson further
muddies the waters when it says that in cases
like this a "distinct set of constitutional
safeguards" exists without saying what these
safeguards are. The law is not as "settled and
familiar" as the Court's opinion says. *** There
needs to be some clarification on the "waiver"
issue and on what "distinct set of constitutional
safeguards" exists in cases like this.
Until this happens, I would decide
consistent with Brewer and a proper balancing of
the competing interests that a defendant can
unilaterally make a valid waiver of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in cases like this
even when this defendant previously has
asserted his right to counsel or, as the Court's
opinion says, has "accepted" appointment of
counsel. There is enough ambiguity and conflict
in existing United States Supreme Court case
law for this Court to give the benefit of the
doubt to the law-abiding citizens of this state
and decide that appellant's voluntary confession
should be admitted into evidence. This is
especially true since we are only dealing with
alleged violations of prophylactic rules and not
violations of constitutional rights. To the extent
Jackson's prophylactic rule would require a
contrary result, I would decline to follow it. ***
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IV. TAINTED "FRUIT"
I also would decide that admission of
appellant's voluntary confession was harmless.
Any error in the admission of appellant's
voluntary confession was rendered harmless by
the admission of appellant's confession to his
father that he murdered the victims. *** The
evidence further shows appellant burglarized
the victims' home at the time of their
disappearances. The jury would have used this
evidence and the other evidence presented by
the prosecution to convict appellant with or
without his voluntary confession.
Finally, it should be noted that any "fruits"
of appellant's voluntary confession are
admissible. This is because the Court decides
that appellant's voluntary confession was
obtained in violation of only a prophylactic rule
meant to safeguard Sixth Amendment rights.
*** The "fruits" of voluntary confessions
obtained in violation of prophylactic rules are
admissible. *** And, I do not understand the
Court's opinion to decide that the prosecution
is precluded from making this claim on remand
since the prosecution has had no reason to raise
it earlier.
I respectfully dissent.
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III. HARM
COBB RECEIVES DEATH PENALTY IN '93 SLAYINGS
The Houston Chronicle
Friday, February 28, 1997
Allan Turner
HUNTSVILLE - As the courtroom was
gripped in tense, chilling silence and his
relatives tightly clasped one another's hands,
Raymond Cobb was sentenced Thursday to die
for the 1993 slaying of a Huntsville woman and
her infant daughter.
Cobb, 20, stared impassively at state
District Judge William McAdams as he read the
sentence. The jury of three women and nine
men deliberated four hours before assessing the
death penalty.
Cobb was convicted Tuesday of capital
murder in the 1993 Christmas holiday murders
of Margaret Owings, 23, and her 16-month-old
daughter, Kon Rae. Their shallow grave was
found about one-half mile from their home
north of Huntsville in November 1995 after
Cobb confessed to the crime.
Cobb said he stabbed Owings at least twice
when she tried to stop him from burglarizing
her house. He then dragged her body into the
woods, returned to carry the sleepless child to
the same site, then buried them both. Cobb
told authorities he buried the infant alive.
Jurors on Thursday spurned the lighter
sentence of life in prison. Had they selected
that option, Cobb would have been imprisoned
a minimum of 40 years, and it would have taken
a two-thirds vote by the parole board to grant
parole. As with all death sentence cases, Cobb
will be entitled to an automatic appeal.
"Justice is done," said Walker County
District Attorney David Weeks after the
sentence was returned. "This is a case in which
everyone was touched. Everyone was a victim
of Raymond
Cobb - not only Maggie Owings and Kori Rae,
but the jurors, the attorneys, the Owings family,
the people of the community, even the family
of Raymond Cobb.
"This is a case that reaches you; I have a 4-
year-old son who was 11 months when Kori
Rae was killed. Anyone who has held a child,
comforted a child must be overwhelmed. This
pulls at the heart. This is the picture of a little
girl gone for absolutely no reason. If this
doesn't move you, nothing will."
Chief defense attorney Hal Ridley, who said
he will file for a new trial within 30 days,
decried the death sentence.
"I have no pride in my community," he
said. "To put a young man to death may make
some happy, but it doesn't do anything for me."
Lindsey Owings, the husband and father of
the victims, told reporters: "This just takes such
a big weight off my shoulders. I'm so tired of
this courthouse, so tired of walking up and
down the hall."
Owings, 34, remarried last year, and his
wife, Sue, at his side for much of the trial,
blamed Cobb for untold heartbreak to the
Owings family and his own.
"At least they have a child," Sue Owings
said of Cobb's family, referring to the 15-
month-old boy born to Cobb's girlfriend two
days after his arrest. "That's more than we
have."
In final punishment phase arguments,
Weeks sounded a similar theme. "Like a petal
dropped in a still pool," he told jurors, Cobb's
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actions radiated outward to victimize all who
came in contact with him.
In an emotional crescendo, which Weeks
later described as "going mainly from the gut,"
the district attorney alluded to the horrific
minutes in which Kori Rae was buried alive.
"Little Kori was in the hole in the cold,
dark woods," Weeks said. ""All she could see
was the cold, gray sky. You know that she
called out to her mother ..... And when she
looked up, all she saw was the face of Raymond
Cobb.
"You know that she held her little arms up.
What did she get?
A shovelful of dirt and another and
another. He could have dug her up. He could
have saved her."
Lindsey Owings' mother, Tommye Owings
of Houston, later said of Weeks' summation,
""He got into my head and into my heart. "
Defense attorney Ridley admitted to jurors
that defending Cobb, who had made multiple
confessions, was not an easy job. But he urged
the panel to spare his client.
"This is a search for more blood," he
argued. ""Already there are two victims out
there, and the second phase of this trial has
been a search for Raymond Cobb's blood."
Reminding jurors that several of Cobb's
former teachers and members of his church
testified on the killer's behalf, Ridley said,
""Raymond Cobb is one of our own. He did
not slip in the dead of night. We did not fail
Raymond Cobb, he failed himself.
"But he's one of ours. Not everyone out
there wants his head on a platter. "
Copyright ( 1997 The Houston Chronicle
Publishing Company
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SELIG v. YOUNG
What Can (and Should) Be Done About Sexual Predators?
Meredith Lugo*
The public groundswell of support for "Megan's laws," which require the registering of sex
offenders, makes it clear that no one wants sexual predators living in their neighborhood. Many want
their elected representatives to lock these criminals up and throw away the key. The state of
Washington, bowing to this public pressure in the aftermath of two violent crimes committed by
known sex offenders, attempted to do just that with the Sexually Violent Predator Statute. Under the
statute, those sex crime defendants who are determined to be sexually violent predators suffering from
a personality disorder or mental abnormality can be involuntarily committed for an indefinite period of
time after serving criminal sentences. This is exactly what happened to Andre Brigham Young, a
convicted rapist who has been confined indefinitely by the state since 1990.
Young originally challenged the statute as a violation of substantive due process and both the ex
post facto and double jeopardy clauses. He was granted summary judgment on these grounds by the
district court. However, the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) upheld Kansas'
Sexually Violent Predator Act, which was modeled after Washington's, against the same challenges. The
majority based its decision on the determination that the statute authorized civil, not criminal,
conmitment. Since it was therefore nonpunitive, neither the ex post facto nor double jeopardy clauses
were applicable. The majority was careful, however, not to rule out the possibility that the application
of such a statute could result in a criminal rather than civil commitment, thus triggering these
Constitutional provisions. In order to establish such an improper application, the party challenging the
statute would be required to prove that "the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate the state's intention" to deem it "civil."
In the case at bar, Young has made just such a claim. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in a panel decision, held that the facts alleged by Young, if proven, would establish
the punitive nature of his confinement. Young alleges that the Special Commitment Center is almost
totally subsumed within the Department of Corrections, and that he is subjected to conditions more
restrictive than those placed on either true civil commitment detainees or state prisoners. Most
damning for the state, Young alleges Washington has done nothing to further its purported goal in
creating the Center, the treatment of sexual offenders. The Center has been declared inappropriate for
mental health treatment and still, after ten years in operation, lacks any certified sex-offender treatment
providers. These conditions led a court-appointed psychologist to conclude that the Center "is designed
and managed, either overtly or covertly, to punish and confine these men and women to a life sentence
without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting." This argument should sway at least Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who in his Hendricks concurrence opined, "If the object or purpose of the Kansas
law had been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere
pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish." Winning over
Kennedy is crucial for Young, for the Hendricks case was decided by a 5-4 vote.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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Admittedly, the psychiatric community disagrees about the effectiveness of treatment for
repeated sex offenders. Conceding this disagreement, as well as the obvious desire of communities to
protect against possible future danger, the question remains whether it is constitutional, or ethical, for
society to determine that some criminals, though not receiving life sentences from the courts, should be
forced to serve such sentences at the behest of the state.
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99-1185 Seling v. Young
Ruling below: (Young v. Weston, 9' Cir., 192 F.3d 870, 65 Crim. L. Rep. 256):
Allegations of habeas corpus petitioner, who has been subjected to indefinite civil commitment under
Washington's sexually violent predator statute, that, among other things, his confinement conditions
are more restrictive than imposed on state prisoners or other civil commitment detainees, that his place
of confinement is located within corrections facility, that confinement conditions are not compatible
with mental health treatment or reasonably related to nonpunitive goal, and that there are no certified
providers of sex offender treatment at facility would, if true, compel conclusion that his confinement is
"punitive" for purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses; district court must hold hearing
on his allegations.
Question presented: Can otherwise valid civil statute be divested of its civil nature and held to violate
double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses because administrative agency operating commitment facility
fails to provide for treatment and other conditions of confinement mandated by statute at some time
during individual's commitment?
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Andre Brigham YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
David WESTON, Superintendent of the Special Commitment Center,
Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 20, 1999
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This case involves the constitutionality of
Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator
Statute as applied to petitioner Andre Brigham
Young. Young has been indefinitely confined
pursuant to the statute since 1990. He appeals
the district court's denial of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 2253, *** and we reverse and
remand in part and affirm in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is the second time that this case is
before us.
The district court originally granted Young's
petition on cross-motions for summary
judgment on the ground that the statute,
R.C.W. § 71.09 ("Washington statute" or
"statute"), violated the United States
Constitution. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp.
744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ("Young T'). When it
granted the petition, the court ruled that the
statute, on its face, violated (1) the substantive
due process protections of the due process
clause because it permits indefinite
incarceration without a showing of mental
illness, (2) the ex post facto clause because it is
punitive and applies retrospectively, and (3) the
double jeopardy clause because it imposes
additional incarceration on a person who has
already been punished for the commission of a
criminal offense. See id. Because the court
found the statute to be facially unconstitutional,
it denied as unnecessary Young's request for a
hearing.
Respondent appealed to this court. While
the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
issued Kansas v. Hendricks, *** (1997). In
Hendricks, the Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that Kansas's involuntary commitment statute
for sexually violent predators ("Kansas statute")
did not violate the substantive due process, ex
post facto, or double jeopardy clauses of the
United States Constitution. Our court then
remanded this matter to the district court for
reconsideration in light of Hendricks. See Young v.
Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Young Il").
On remand, the district court received
supplemental briefing on the impact of
Hendicks. After oral argument, but without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district
court denied Young's petition. *** Young
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Young's challenge to his indefinite
confinement raises numerous issues, which can
be grouped into four general categories: (1)
whether the Washington statute violates the ex
post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the
United States Constitution, because the statute's
effect is punitive; (2) whether the interpretation
and implementation of the statute violates the
substantive due process protections of the due
process clause of the United States
Constitution; (3) whether the statute, on its face
and as interpreted by the Washington Supreme
Court, violates the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution; and (4) whether
Young's confinement is unlawful because (a) he
was denied a constitutionally required probable
cause hearing, and (b) the commitment trial
court committed several trial errors.
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LThe linchpin of this case is whether the
Washington statute, as applied to Young, is
punitive and thereby subject to the ex post facto
and double jeopardy clauses of the United
States Constitution. The ex post facto clause
"forbids the application of any new punitive
measure to a crime already consummated."
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086 ***; U.S. Const.,
art. 1, § 10. The double jeopardy clause
prevents the state from "punishing twice, or
attempting a second time to punish criminally,
for the same offense." Id. at 2085 ***; U.S.
Const., amend. 5. If the Washington statute is
punitive, then it (1) imposes a new punitive
measure - indefinite confinement - on Young
for crimes he committed before the statute's
enactment, and (2) punishes Young again, after
he has already served his criminal sentences, for
the same criminal offenses. Therefore, if
Young's confinement pursuant to the
Washington statute is punitive, then the statute,
as applied to Young, violates the ex post facto
and double jeopardy clauses of the United
States Constitution.
A.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that,
because involuntary confinement pursuant to
Kansas's civil commitment statute is not
punitive, that statute's operation does not raise
ex post facto or double jeopardy concerns. ***
Because the Kansas statute was modeled on
and is substantially similar to the Washington
statute, Hendricks forecloses the claim that the
Washington statute, on its face, violates the ex
post facto and double jeopardy clauses.
But Hendricks does not preclude the
possibility that the Washington statute, as
applied, is punitive. *** In fact, both the majority
and concurring opinions in Hendricks turn
repeatedly to the question whether the
conditions of Hendricks's confinement
rendered the Kansas statute punitive. ***
Heeding Justice Kennedy's reminder that our
concern is not "how long [Young] and others
like him should serve a criminal sentence," but
rather "whether it is the criminal system or civil
system which should make the decision," ***,
we must determine whether Young's
confinement is criminal rather than civil. And,
following the dictates of Hendicks, we look to
the conditions of Young's confinement when we
make that determination. ***
Actual conditions of confinement may
divest a facially valid statute of its "civil" label
only upon a showing by the "clearest proof'
that the statutory scheme is punitive in its
"effect." *** As discussed below, we conclude
that Young has alleged sufficient facts that, if
proved, would constitute such "clear proof."
B.
Young has exhausted his claim that his
conditions of confinement at the Special
Commitment Center render the Washington
statute, as applied to him, punitive. Not only
did Young raise the "substance" of his claim to
the Washington state courts, ***, but he
repeatedly attempted to present to the state
courts evidence of the conditions of his
confinement and the quality of treatment at the
Special Commitment Center. The fact that the
state courts refused to receive this evidence
does not render Young's claim unexhausted.
C.
"An evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus
petition is required whenever a petitioner's
allegations, if proved, would entitle him to
relief, and no state court trier of fact has, after a
full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant
facts." *** In reviewing the district court's
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, this court
considers the following questions: (1) did
Young allege facts which, if proved, would
entitle him to relief, and (2) if so, did a state
court reliably find the relevant facts.
We hold that Young alleged facts which, if
proved, would establish the punitive nature of
his confinement and would entitle him to relief.
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Young's initial allegations before the district
court included the following:
- Young is subject to conditions more
restrictive than those placed either on true civil
commitment detainees or even those placed on
state prisoners; ***
- Young has been subject to such
conditions for more than seven years; ***
- The Special Commitment Center is
located wholly within the perimeter of a larger
Department of Corrections facility and relies on
the Department of Corrections for a host of
essential services, including library services,
medical care, food, and security; ***
- The conditions of confinement at the
Special Commitment Center are not compatible
with the Washington statute's treatment
purposes; ***
- The conditions and restrictions at the
Special Commitment Center are not reasonably
related to a legitimate non-punitive goal; ***
and
- The conditions of confinement at the
Special Commitment Center do not comport
with substantive due process. ***
In Young's motion to alter the district
court's judgment denying his writ of habeas
corpus, Young presented further allegations:
- Court-appointed Resident Advocate,
psychologist Stanley Greenberg, concluded in
his final report, "because the SCC [Special
Commitment Center] hasn't fundamentally
changed over so many years, even with a court
injunction, I have come to suspect that it is
designed and managed, either overtly or
covertly, to punish and confine these men and
women to a life sentence without any hope of
release to a less restrictive setting";
- The Department of Corrections staffs
role in running the Special Commitment Center
had increased: daily Department of Corrections
security "walk-throughs"; continued
Department of Corrections responsibility for
Special Commitment Center residents' medical
care (including requirements that residents be
shackled and dressed in prison jumpsuit when
taken to the Washington State Reformatory
infirmary); and continued Department of
Corrections responsibility for meals; ***
- Special Commitment Center residents
were housed in units that were, according to
Special Master Janice Marques, "clearly
inappropriate for individuals in a mental health
treatment program"; *** and
- There were still no certified sex-offender
treatment providers at Special Commitment
Center. ***
By alleging that Washington's sexually violent
predator statute is punitive as applied, Young
alleged facts which, if proved, would entitle him
to relief. Therefore, we must consider whether
a state court reliably found the relevant facts.
It is clear to us that the Washington state
courts did not afford Young a full and fair
hearing concerning the conditions of
confinement in the Special Commitment
Center. The trial court refused to allow Young
to present factual evidence on the actual
conditions of confinement and the quality of
treatment at trial either in a challenge to the law
or before the jury. Nor did Young's factual
challenge regarding the conditions of
confinement receive a full and fair hearing by
the Washington Supreme Court. Indeed,
despite its consideration of the question
whether the actual impact of the statute was
criminal, ***, the Washington Supreme Court
declared in its discussion of Young's
substantive due process claims that the issues
of the actual conditions of confinement and the
quality of treatment were "not before the
court." ***
"The power of inquiry on federal habeas
corpus is plenary." *** Here, where the state
trier of fact did not afford Young a full and fair
hearing concerning the conditions of
confinement in the Special Commitment
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Center, Young is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing in federal district court.
CONCLUSION
Because the district court did not conduct
an evidentiary hearing on the question whether
the conditions of Young's confinement at the
Special Commitment Center rendered the
statute punitive as applied to Young, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings on the ex
post facto and double jeopardy clause claims. We
affirm the district court on all other grounds.
REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
AFFIRMED in part.
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HIGH COURT TO TAKE UP SEXUAL-PREDATOR LAW
Justices to Weigh Rapist's Case Against State Statute
Seattle Post-Inteligencer
Tuesday, March 21,2000
Elaine Porterfield
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday
to hear arguments over conflicts between state
and federal court decisions regarding
Washington's controversial sex-predator law.
The justices, granting an appeal by state
officials, said they will review rapist Andre
Brigham Young's fight over how Washington's
Sexually Violent Predator Statute applies to
him.
The nation's high court has already ruled
that the law itself is constitutional, saying
confinement as a sex predator does not violate
the right to due process and is not double
punishment for the same crime.
The confinement, intended to protect
society, is civil, not punitive, the court decided
three years ago.
But Young, convicted of five rapes over 31
years, contends conditions at the state's Special
Commitment Center are indeed punitive.
U.S. District Judge William Dwyer held the
center in contempt in November for failing to
comply with his order to improve conditions.
Dwyer castigated the center for inadequate
mental-health treatment, an oppressive
environment and failing to follow through on
previous court orders.
The center at McNeil Island, run by the
state Department of Social and Health Services,
indefinitely holds sex offenders deemed as high
risk to reoffend after they have completed
serving their prison sentences.
Ruling in Young's case last May, a three-
judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals said that he should have a chance to
prove before a federal trial judge that his
confinement is in fact punishment because he is
being denied the "adequate care and
individualized treatment" the state law calls for.
The panel ordered a federal trial judge to
reconsider Young's case.
But the state Supreme Court, ruling in a
similar sex-predator case, refused to follow the
9th Circuit, said Bill Collins, an assistant state
attorney general.
In seeking to derail the 9th Circuit decision,
the state's lawyers told U.S. Supreme Court
justices that the appeals court's ruling is
unwarranted and "unworkable in practice."
"The 9th Circuit decision casts serious
doubt on our ability to civilly commit these
dangerous sex predators," Washington
Attorney General Christine Gregoire said
yesterday. "Washington has been a leader in
protecting the public from sexually violent
predators, and we are going to fight to keep our
communities safe."
Bob Boruchowitz, head of the Defender's
Association, said he's pleased the high court is
considering the Young case.
"This is an opportunity to make clear that
the state cannot put someone in prison and
pretend that it's treatment," Boruchowitz said.
"It cannot be the case the state can be
permitted to lock someone up and pretend it's
treatment indefinitely. There must be a way for
a person in that situation to assert their
constitutional rights."
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The U.S. Supreme Court is closely divided
on the sex-predator confinement law,
upholding it three years ago on a 5-4 vote.
Justice Anthony Kennedy voted with the
majority but said in a separate opinion that if
the law turned out to be a sham he would vote
the other way, Boruchowitz said.
Arguments in the Young case will likely
occur next fall, with a ruling expected in spring
2001.
Copyright C 2000 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
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SEX OFFENDER CENTER: 10 YEARS OF TROUBLE
U.S. High Court to Review Case of 6- Time Rapist HeldAfter Prison
The Seatde Times
Tuesday, March 21,2000
Mike Carter
McNEIL ISLAND, Pierce County - In
four squat buildings inside a medium-
security prison, the state runs a treatment
center for violent sexual predators that is
both the first of its kind in the country
and, by most accounts, the worst.
The Special Commitment Center was
created 10 years ago to answer a pressing
public-safety question: how to protect the
community from rapists and molesters
who were about to be released from
prison after serving their sentences.
But in trying to answer the safety
question, the state created a tangle of legal
and financial problems for which there are
no easy answers. Even the U.S. Supreme
Court has gotten involved, announcing
yesterday that it will review the case of six-
time rapist Andre Brigham Young,
committed against his will at the center.
Young claims the center is more a
prison than a hospital, in violation of his
civil rights. If the high court sees merit in
that claim, it will send the case back to a
federal judge in Seattle who could let
Young go. That could ultimately lead to
the court-ordered release of others.
"It just makes me want to pull the
covers over my head," laments Rep. Ida
Ballasiotes, R-Mercer Island, once a moral
force behind creation of the center who
now sees it as ill-conceived and wasteful.
"Solution? I don't have one," she said,
"except I do know that whatever it is, it is
going to cost lots and lots of money."
The financial burden has always been on
taxpayers, and it's only getting heavier.
In November, another federal judge in
Seattle found the center in contempt of
court for not providing adequate
treatment. Since then, the state has made a
concerted effort to shore up the program.
Next month, the judge will decide
whether those efforts have been adequate.
If they haven't, he will begin imposing
steep fines on May 1. Cost to taxpayers:
$5,000 a day until the center shapes up.
That judge is highly critical of the fact
that the treatment center was placed inside
a prison. To remedy that concern, the
state says it needs a new treatment facility
- one next to, but not inside, the state
prison here. Cost to taxpayers if the
Legislature approves funding: $81 million.
Already, the state pays $130,000 a year
for each of the 106 residents who, upon
their release from prison, were committed
here involuntarily - ostensibly to get better
and some day rejoin society. By
comparison, a prison inmate costs the
state $25,000 a year.
Yet, despite the costs, not a single
resident has successfully completed
treatment and been deemed by the state
suitable for release from the program -
although six have won release through
court action, as Young is trying to do.
"It's all unraveling," says lawyer John
Phillips, who has successfully represented
a number of residents in a civil-rights
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action in federal court. "And now, quite
frankly, we're headed for a train wreck."
The program has been a challenge for
the state, but an emergency infusion of
cash has helped address key problems,
said Edwin Hidano, an assistant secretary
of the state Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS), which oversees
it. "This is the first of its kind in the
nation, and we have not had the
opportunity to learn from others'
mistakes. We're trying very hard to
comply with the courts' orders."
Long list of challenges
Despite the court-acknowledged
improvements in the past couple of years,
the depth and breadth of the center's
problems are indeed daunting:
A recent move from the state prison
in Monroe to the state prison on McNeil
Island has been a disappointment. The
courts have repeatedly ordered the
commitment center - run by the
Department of Social and Health Services
- to extricate itself from the Department
of Corrections. The move to McNeil
Island only entangled the two more. In
addition, the center lost 90 percent of its
staff during the move, and is having
trouble finding qualified replacements.
The center's former clinical director, a
nationally recognized expert in sex-
offender treatment, quit last fall, blasting
the center's administration and the state's
refusal to adequately fund the program.
Legal costs for the program are
crippling - fully one of every three dollars
spent goes to pay attorneys. In the past
two years alone, the state has paid nearly a
half-million dollars to residents and their
attorneys to settle lawsuits alleging
everything from civil-rights violations to
physical abuse.
In one case alone, a resident who was
severely beaten, allegedly by a counselor,
was given $68,000. The same resident, in
another instance, was denied food for
three days and placed in solitary
confinement for more than two months
for refusing to come out of his room.
"Remember, these men are not
prisoners. They have done their time, paid
society's price," said Phillips, the attorney.
"Now society has chosen to isolate them,
for our protection and, ostensibly, for the
good of the residents, to somehow help
them.
"Over and over, you hear the term 'for
the benefit of the residents,' " he said.
"That, unfortunately, is a phrase that has
little real meaning there."
Two crimes inspire law
Doing anything to benefit sex
offenders was the last thing on the minds
of legislators when they passed the
Community Protection Act of 1990.
Along with creating the commitment
center, which received its first residents
the following year, the act increased
prison sentences for some sex crimes and
required offenders to register when they
got out.
The law was passed after two
particularly outrageous crimes by paroled
sex offenders: the 1987 abduction, rape
and murder of Ballasiotes' daughter and
the 1989 rape and sexual mutilation of a
7-year-old Tacoma boy.
Critics of the law, to this day, maintain
it was a thinly disguised effort to
retroactively apply the stiff new prison
sentences to offenders who were already
incarcerated or about to get out.
Proponents maintain its goal was, in
essence, to quarantine sexually violent
predators by sending them into a secure
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"hospital" for long-term - and they hoped
it would be very long-term - treatment.
A decade later, those arguments are
unchanged, but there's one odd twist:
Both sides agree that DSHS has done a
lousy job operating the center.
"We made it quite clear at the
beginning it would be very expensive,"
said David Boerner, a Seattle University
law professor and former prosecutor who
helped write the law. "We told them they
would have to make a good-faith effort to
treat them, not just isolate them."
Boerner and King County Prosecutor
Norm Maleng, who chaired a 1989 task
force that recommended the law, both
believe it has kept some predators off the
streets. But both also say the center's legal
problems raise legitimate questions about
the way the program has been operated
and funded.
"This is a serious issue, and I believe
the Legislature has to respond and
respond now," Maleng said in a recent
interview.
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court
narrowly upheld the constitutionality of
sex-offender civil commitments, ruling on
a Kansas law based on Washington's
statute. One point the high court
emphasized at the time was that treatment
couldn't merely be a ruse to indefinitely
detain someone.
John La Fond, a former Seattle
University law professor who was one of
the chief opponents of the proposed law
in the 19 80s, believes that is exactly what
has happened.
"The foundation of this law was built
on sand - it was never enacted to be a
bona fide civil-commitment law intent on
offering these people treatment and a way
back into the community," said La Fond,
who now teaches law at the University of
Missouri-Kansas City.
"This was and is a selective extension
of prison sentences under the guise of
civil commitment, and now the state has
two courts calling its bluff," he said.
"They've brought this on themselves."
In the decade since the law was
passed, 15 other states have adopted some
form of a sex-predator-commitment law.
All have looked at Washington's program
as the way not to do it.
Indeed, even Dr. Mark Seling, the
director of the commitment center here,
warns other states away from the mistakes
Washington has made. At the same time,
Seling says the state has learned from
those errors and is doing all it can to
correct them.
"We can't erase our history. But we
can learn from it," said Seling.
Inside the center
Inside the state prison here on McNeil
Island, once a federal penitentiary,
residents in the treatment program are
segregated in two large cellblocks - Seling
calls them "residential pods."
They live alone in standard 7 1/2-foot
by 12-foot cells that would be double-
bunked if used by prison inmates.
Residents are allowed personal property
such as stereos and computers - without
Internet access - and can wear street
clothes.
The other distinctions between prison
and civil commitment are far subtler.
Seling points out that the pod floor is
carpeted - "You won't see that in prison" -
and notes the chairs around community
tables aren't bolted down.
The residents have access to a wood
shop, a music room, the prison library and
a small gymnasium and weight room. The
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court has been adamant in its orders that
the treatment program be separate from
the surrounding prison. That, until
recently, restricted residents' access to the
prison chapel and the "big yard" -
McNeil's outdoor, football field-sized
exercise yard.
Treatment, in one form or another,
has always been available to them, though
in the early years only a handful took part.
Now, more residents than ever - 61 of
the 106 - are receiving one-on-one
therapy, group therapy and counseling for
drug and alcohol dependency. They
undergo sexual-arousal modification -
where they learn to redirect their fantasies
- and in some cases are given drugs for
"chemical castration."
But there is much in the way of
treatment that has not been done - for
example, developing individualized
treatment plans for each resident and
involving family members in the plan -
according to an expert overseeing
compliance with a 6-year-old court order
requiring a variety of improvements.
Residents complain that the
requirements of treatment change
frequently, invalidating their earlier
efforts.
The move to McNeil from Monroe
has only intensified the problems. The
center misplaced hundreds of records in
the move, and some residents lost credit
for years of treatment.
There have been other setbacks to
improving treatment as well.
Last August, Dr. Robert Smith - the
center's clinical director and a nationally
recognized expert in sex-offender
treatment - quit. He has since been
harshly critical of the program's
administration.
In sworn statements in the federal
contempt case against the treatment
center, Smith called the program
dysfunctional and criticized Seling for
interfering with his vision of a better
treatment model.
Smith was also harshly critical of the
funding and support for the program. He
testified things were worse than when he
was hired three years ago.
When he left in August, he said,
resident-to-staff ratios had doubled since
the move to McNeil.
Virtually none of the center's
counselors are certified in sex-offender
treatment, and the one clinical
psychologist on staff - now the acting
clinical director - had no prior experience
dealing with sex offenders.
Seling acknowledges the DSHS he has
had a difficult time finding qualified
replacements for the 90 percent of its
commitment staff unwilling to commute
to McNeil Island.
"The program continually goes
through arbitrary changes that negate
what you have done before," said resident
Mitch Gaff, a rapist who has been at the
center for five years. "In the first three-
and-a-half years, they never offered me a
single class or psycho-educational model."
Perhaps the most glaring failure has
been the lack of any transitional-release
program for residents who complete
treatment. In 1992, an expert witness in
treatment, hired by the state, testified in
one federal court case that the lack of
such a program was a fatal flaw.
The state has yet to establish such a
program.
'Entrenched resistance'
Virtually since the day the law passed
that created the center, the state has been
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in court defending it - and not very
successfully. Currently, there are a half-
dozen lawsuits by residents pending in
state and federal courts, the most recent
filed in January in federal court in
Tacoma.
In 1994, a federal jury found the state
was not providing adequate treatment. To
remedy that, U.S. District Judge William
Dwyer issued an injunction ordering the
center, among other things, to hire
professionally trained staff, develop better
treatment programs and prepare
individualized treatment programs for
offenders.
Indeed, six years after Dwyer's order,
the state has not met all of its
requirements, although the judge has
recognized the considerable progress over
the past couple of years.
The Dwyer contempt citation poses
the most immediate headache for the
state, in that the judge has threatened fines
of more than $35,000 a week beginning
May 1 and continuing until the state
complies with his injunction. A
compliance hearing is set for April 18.
The state has appealed Dwyer's contempt
citation.
In his November contempt order, the
judge accused the state of an "entrenched
resistance" and failure to "devote the
resources necessary to achieve
compliance."
"The defendants have fallen into a
pattern of first denying that anything is
amiss at (the center), then engaging in a
flurry of activity to make improvements
before the next court hearing, then
admitting ... that shortfalls of
constitutional magnitude still exist, then
returning to denial," Dwyer wrote.
While Dwyer's contempt citation
might cost the state money, the more
serious, long-term threat involves the
petition for release filed by Andre
Brigham Young, assigned to U.S. District
Judge John Coughenour of Seattle.
Young, 59, was convicted of six rapes
in 31 years. Nine years ago, on the day
before he was to be released from prison,
he was whisked away to the commitment
center, where he has refused to avail
himself of treatment.
Young has argued that being held
against his will at the center is
punishment, not therapy, and claims it
violates the constitutional ban against
being punished twice for the same crime.
What makes the case particularly
problematic is that Dwyer's critical
findings will be used to bolster Young's
case.
"It provides support for our ongoing
argument that the statute is punitive in its
purpose and effect," said Bob
Boruchowitz, Young's attorney. "For all
intents and purposes, he's been in prison.
And under American law and common
sense, you cannot punish Mr. Young for a
crime for which he has already served his
time."
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals had
ordered Cougenhour to hold a hearing in
Young's case. The state appealed, and
yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to consider whether Young should be
asking for his own release, or whether he
should instead be seeking improvements
in the program.
Signs of change
As serious as the commitment center's
problem are, there have been recent
improvements. Gaff, who served 10 years
in prison for raping and sodomizing two
sisters age 14 and 16 in Snohomish
County, said he had not been offered a
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single treatment class until about a year-
and-a-half ago. He's since taken 42 classes.
Gaff is among three residents Seling
says the commitment center is prepared to
recommend for conditional release into
the community within the next three
months.
They would be the first proposed
releases ever endorsed by the state. In the
past decade, just six residents have been
let out - all on court order and all over the
objections of center clinicians. None has
been charged with new crimes.
"Two-and-a-half years ago, there was
no path" out of the center through
treatment, said Seattle attorney Sam
Elwonger, a court-appointed ombudsman
at the center. "Let alone the 'brightly lit'
one" demanded by the courts.
"I've watched them add and add and
add to the skeleton of a treatment
program. It's been an evolution," he said.
Seling says an emergency infusion of
$5 million after Dwyer's contempt order
has let him address many of those issues.
In the past three months, he has hired 24
clinicians, and the state is hunting for a
new clinical director.
The DSHS earlier this month
announced it is considering the old Indian
Ridge Youth Camp in Arlington as the
site for a possible transitional halfway
house.
"This is the first time we've ever been
at full staff," Seling said. "I think we're
there, at least as far as the treatment
program is concerned.
"We have developed a plan to respond
to all of the court orders and reports," he
said. "Now, we'll just have to see what the
judge is going to do," referring to Dwyer.
Lessons from other states
Kansas, Minnesota, Arizona and a
dozen other states were able to start and
run commitment programs for sex
offenders without getting mired in the
legal swamp that Washington is in.
The difference seems to be that most
entered into their program with a serious
intent to treat offenders and to help them
get back into the community.
Arizona, for example, has a secure
commitment center. But before
committing an offender to the center, it
considers less-restrictive alternatives:
home confinement, electronic monitoring
or release into a halfway house.
Minnesota also runs a center, but it
allows residents to earn privileges,
including supervised community release,
as they advance through treatment.
Texas passed a civil-commitment law
but doesn't have a secure facility. Instead,
it places sex offenders back into the
community - with strings - after their
release from prison. If they violate the
terms of what amounts to a "civil parole,"
it's a crime and they are sent back to
prison.
The other states with commitment
centers have avoided Washington's
cardinal mistake of locating them in a
prison.
Resolving that single issue, above all
others, would send Washington a long
way down the path toward getting out
from beneath Dwyer's injunction.
The DSHS has recognized this, and
has proposed constructing an $81 million,
402-bed center next to the prison here,
but not within its fences.
The House, so far, has balked at
funding that project, turning aside Gov.
Gary Locke's emergency request for $14
million to build the center's first 48 beds.
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Without it, the governor says the state
is almost assured to be fined by the court.
High costs for center
According to DSHS projections, the
new commitment center - if it gets built -
would be full shortly after its expected
completion in 2005.
With an estimated 25 new residents
coming in each year - and few, if any,
getting out - the new center would soon
be well over capacity, with a projected 550
residents in the year 2013. And even at
today's cost per resident, that would
require an operating budget alone of at
least $72 million a year.
The commitment center's operating
budget for 1999 was $9.4 million, not
counting the $5 million Locke gave the
program after Dwyer's contempt citation
in November.
Eric Janus, a professor of mental-
health law in St. Paul, Minn., predicts that
"the money will get so big that, eventually,
states will simply stop doing it."
Already, some lawmakers here,
watching the comniitment center's budget
bloom from year to year, think the center
is a failed experiment and that the time
has come to stop throwing good money
after bad.
"It has become very apparent that the
costs of those residents at McNeil Island
has become a drain," said Rep. Tom Huff,
the House Republican's chief budget
writer. "They just keep going up and going
up with no end in sight."
The problem is, there are few if any
alternatives, at least for those already in -
or about to be committed to - the
treatment center.
Three years ago, Washington passed a
"two-strikes" law that imposes life
sentences for certain repeat sex offenders.
That law was in direct response to the
burgeoning population at the commitment
center, but it would have no effect on that
population for years.
This year, House budget writers,
dismayed at the looming costs of the
commitment center, tried to pass a law
that would allow for longer prison terms
for some first-time sex offenders, again in
hopes of staunching the flow of predators
into civil commitment. The bill died in the
Senate.
Yet as financially painful as the
commitment center has proved to be,
nobody is considering closing it down,
because that would mean letting the
residents go.
Washington is not even willing - at
least not now - to seriously consider the
less restrictive options that other states are
trying.
Meantime, Locke has urged
lawmakers to pony up for now, or risk
further court sanctions.
"We can't afford to wait," he said.
Copyright 0 2000 The Seattle Times
Company
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Also This Term:
99-1238 Artuz v. Bennett
Ruling below (2d Cir., 66 Crim. L. Rep. 69):
Issue of whether petition for state collateral relief is "properly filed" under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2), which
provides that pendency of properly filed state petition serves to toll limitations period for bringing
petition for federal habeas corpus relief covering same claims, turns only on whether state petition was
submitted in accordance with state's procedural requirements such as time and place for filing, and not
on possibility that state petition is subject to mandatory procedural bar under state law.
Question presented: Is state court post-conviction application "properly filed" within meaning of
Section 2244(d)(2), which tolls one-year statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions in 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, if it is filed in court that does not have power to hear
merits of application?
99-804 Cleveland v. United States
Ruling below: (United States v. Bankston, 5th Cir., 182 F.3d 296):
Defendant's conviction of mail fraud and other offenses on basis of scheme to defraud state regulators
in obtaining video poker licenses is affirmed; under United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131 (7 h Cir.
1997), state video poker license is "property" for purposes of mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341;
defendant's other contentions do not warrant reversal.
Question presented: Can alleged false statement or omissions in applications for state licenses be basis
for federal mail or wire fraud charges, on theory that license that has not yet been issued constitutes
state "property" of which state is deprived when it issues license?
99-7504 Lopez v. Davis
Ruling below (Bellis v. Davis, 8th Cir., 186 F.3d 1092, 65 Crim. L. Rep. 549 (1999)):
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2), which states that federal Bureau of Prisons "may" reduce sentence of
prisoner convicted of "nonviolent" offenses by up to one year if prisoner completes residential drug
treatment program, BOP has discretion to decide categorically that some prisoners, including those
convicted of being felon in possession of firearm or those whose sentences were enhanced on basis of
possession of dangerous weapon during commission of drug offense, are ineligible even though their
offenses were "nonviolent."
Question presented: Does director of federal Bureaus of Prisons have authority to categorically deny
consideration for eligibility for early release under Section 3621(e)(2) to inmate who was convicted of
nonviolent offense and who has completed residential substance abuse program as required by early
release statute?
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99-8576 Glover v. United States
Ruling below (7t Cir., 7/15/99, unpublished):
Even assuming that habeas corpus petitioner's attorneys' ineffective representation before sentencing
court led to sentence that was six to 21 months longer than it should have been, potential decrease of
that duration is insufficiently significant, under prejudice prong of test for counsel ineffectiveness under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to permit collateral attack.
Questions presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that additional six to 21 months in
prison due to counsel's error relating to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fails to satisfy "prejudice" prong of
Strickland v. Washington? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding that two-level error in offense level
under sentencing guidelines was per se insufficient to satisfy "prejudice" prong of Strickland v.
Washington even when this two-level error resulted in petitioner being sentenced to additional six to 21
months in prison?
99-6218 Rogers v. Tennessee
Ruling below (Tenn., 992 S.W.2d 393, 65 Crim. L. Rep. 233):
Common law year-and-a-day rule, which bars homicide prosecution unless defendant's victim dies
within one year and one day after injury inflicted by defendant, is hereby abolished; neither Fifth nor
14t Amendment bars retrospective application of decision abrogating such rule, which had been
judicially or legislatively abolished in many other jurisdictions prior to time defendant stabbed victim,
has been mentioned favorably in this state only once since 1907 in intermediate appellate court more
than 20 years ago, was questioned in 1995 decision, has been abolished by every court that has squarely
faced issue, and has never served as ground of decision in any Tennessee case.
Question presented: Does ex post facto application of judicial ruling abrogating substantive rule of
criminal law known as "year-and-a-day rule" to homicide committed five years prior to change in
substantive rule of law violate Fifth and 14th Amendments?
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